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Introduction
In the 21st century, the American labor market is best defined by instability. Since
the 1970s, more and more Americans have been forced into precarious work
arrangements that fail to ensure job security, livable wage-rates, or employee
satisfaction. A dark cloud swirls around the labor market in the form of contingent work.
Contingent workers are not guaranteed the same protections and securities as
traditional employees. Firms revel in an employment landscape that allows them to
deploy and terminate workers with ease. Contingent work has carved its own position in
the economy in the form of the Gig economy. The Gig economy marks a pivot in
American employment relationships: where the postwar labor market served to fortify
long-term commitments between firms and their workers, the Gig economy has
propelled workers towards vulnerability.
Despite its casualization of the American economy, the Gig economy has also
inspired the emergence of a new, and potentially significant, form of commercial
exchange in the On-Demand economy. The On-Demand economy is comprised of appbased platforms that connect consumers with workers who provide a single service or
form of exchange. On the surface, this sector of the economy simply exacerbates a
structural trend towards precarity. This assessment is short-sighted. On-Demand
platforms offer groundbreaking forms of commercial exchange. Consumers can request
a service, and within minutes, have their whims conveniently satisfied. Recent
technological advancements have inspired the growth of business models that were
implausible less than two decades ago. Today, most On-Demand platforms placate the
desires of consumers. These platforms have the potential to generate consumer
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demand and ensure the provision of vital services to the weakest among us. With the
On-Demand economy, workers can benefit from the ability to assert sovereignty in a
labor market that has subjugated them for the past several decades.
Currently, the On-Demand economy is hindered by the fact that it is a product of
the wider Gig economy. The former may inspire innovation and creative forms of
exchange, but it still operates under the auspices of the latter. Therefore, On-Demand
workers are pushed into unstable and unpredictable employment arrangements. The
predominant systems responsible for protecting and advocating for American workers
were constructed in the early 20th century, during the New Deal. The public policies and
institutions ushered in by the New Deal have undoubtedly enhanced the livelihoods of
millions of Americans. Despite this fact, these systems and forms of protections have
frayed over the past several decades; they were never intended to satisfy the needs of
workers in the Gig and On-Demand economy. If the rules and regulations outlined by
the New Deal were imposed on firms in the On-Demand economy, the results would be
disastrous. While conventional policy prescriptions could theoretically benefit workers,
they would smother the emerging On-Demand economy, and inhibit the flexibility it
avails to workers.
Macrostructural trends have provoked the rise of the nefarious Gig economy as
well as the potentially valuable On-Demand economy. Both sectors of the economy
challenge the traditional methods by which workers are guaranteed security and
stability. The goal of this Thesis is to investigate how labor protections and benefits can
be reimagined in order to empower American workers whilst simultaneously fostering
innovation and flexibility in the On-Demand economy.

5

Chapter 1 examines the transformation of the American labor market since the
1970s. There is a plethora of indicators that demonstrates a structural shift towards
precarious work arrangements and these statistics underpin my research project.
What’s more, the federal government has failed to capture the size of the Gig and OnDemand workforce and non-governmental organizations have had to pick up the slack.
Chapter 1 also offers an in-depth analysis of the inner-workings of the On-Demand
economy.
Chapter 2 is comprised of case studies performed on three popular On-Demand
platforms: Uber, Airbnb, and TaskRabbit. The case studies reveal that all three
platforms vary from one another another in terms of generating consumer demand,
impacting local economies, and skirting existing regulations. The case studies also
contemplate the experiences of On-Demand workers and how the three platforms
creatively employ technology.
Chapter 3 considers the existing systems and institutions that protect and
advocate for American workers. This chapter primarily surveys government- and
workplace-sponsored benefits and sources of collective organization. There are
historical parallels to the experiences of On-Demand workers and they are worthy of
consideration. However, Chapter 3 ultimately concludes that the predominant
institutions and public policies responsible for advancing the interests of American
workers have been rendered inadequate in the Gig and On-Demand economy.
Chapter 4 explores how public policies and institutions can act to unleash the
potential of the On-Demand economy while also protecting and liberating workers. This
chapter re-examines many of the concepts discussed throughout this Thesis and
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considers how they can be applied to best serve both employers and employees. This
Thesis concludes that the On-Demand economy can thrive in an environment where
workers are guaranteed legitimate protections.
A glossary at the end of the document clarifies some of the terminology used in
this Thesis.
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Chapter 1: Rethinking Labor Relationships
I.

The Trend of Growth and Transition into the Gig Economy
There is a precedent for tectonic shifts in the American employer-employee

relationship, the first of which occurring in the Artisanal era. The following account
borrows heavily from the historical overview found in Katherine Stone’s From Widgets to
Digits. During the Artisanal era – primarily the 17th and 18th centuries - the production
process was perceived as a partnership. This is primarily due to the fact that skilled
workers held leverage over employers in the form of human capital: they, and only they,
knew how to complete the jobs they were assigned to. The labor relationships prevalent
in this era are distinct from contemporary employer-employee relationships because
greater power was held in hands of workers. Their skills granted them independence
and they typically used their own tools when carrying out a job. Manufacturers, who
would recruit skilled artisans, supplied the “workplace, the raw materials, and
marketing.”1 Offering an environment to work in was largely the extent to which the
employer held tutelage over the production process. Oftentimes, skilled workers would
recruit and pay unskilled workers by offering them a cut of their overall compensation.2
Characterizing this era of employment through a contemporary lens is challenging. In
fact, even using the terms employer and employee is misleading: there was little-to-no
expectation of maintaining a long-term relationship. Artisans moved job-to-job, confident
in the fact that demand for their talents would remain relatively constant.

1

Stone, Katherine Van Wezel. From Widgets to Digits: Employment Regulation for the Changing
Workplace. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2004. 15-16.
2
Stone. From Widgets to Digits. 15-16.
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While the Artisan era was far more rudimentary than the Industrial employeremployee relationship, it introduced unions to the American workplace. In the 19th
century, craft unions “codified the traditional workplace rules into” a unilaterally enforced
code of conduct. Instead of being negotiated with individual manufacturers, the set of
rules were decided upon at union meetings and conventions and “enforced through
censorship, expulsion, and fines.”3 Skilled workers held the first labor force monopoly in
America.45
The supremacy of craft unions began to erode during to the first-wave of
Industrialization in the 19th century. The rise of factories and managers’ opposition to
unionization bode poorly for artisans. The production process became more
mechanized and, as a result, demand for unskilled labor increased. What’s more, the
legal system began introducing doctrines that undermined the power of craft unions.
One of the most critical, the “at-will doctrine,” made employment relationships more
flexible by allowing either party to terminate the employment contract at any time for any
reason.6 The quest for increased productivity led manufacturers down a path
determined to break apart unions and the monopoly they held on skilled labor. The
union busting practices that brought the Artisanal era to a close spurred a
transformative shift in the employer-employee relationship, giving birth to the Industrial
era.
The Industrial era of the late 19th to early 20th century is best characterized by
mass production for national markets. The dismantling of craft unions led to a “crisis of

3

Stone. Widgets to Digits. 18.
Stone. Widgets to Digits. 18.
5
Stone. Widgets to Digits. 18.
6
Stone. Widgets to Digits. 20-26.
4
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discipline and morale on the shop floor.”7 A “labor problem” emerged in the form of
unmotivated workers expressing radical opposition to management. Not only did the
labor problem breed bad relations between employers and employees, it also hindered
the productive capacity of factories.8 In order to motivate workers and maintain high
levels of productivity, manufacturers felt it necessary to reinforce the bonds holding
them and their employees together. Thus, industrialists introduced methods of
incentivization. Frederick Taylor’s system of wage determination created a two-tier
wage system in which the most productive workers earned higher wages. Eventually,
the “Taylorist” rubric matriculated into “scientific management” which sought to reduce
the production process to a blueprint that allowed a factory to “control for the flow of all
work through the production process.”9
Scientific management is predicated on the belief that all production knowledge
can be described in scientific terms, “reduced to written form, and transmitted as
discrete instructions to each worker on a need-to-know basis.”10 While Taylorism as an
overall practice was outlawed by congress, the individual solutions it prescribed to
employers became commonplace. Some political economists, like Harry Braverman,
have criticized scientific management because it grants a greater degree of authority to
factory owners. Braverman notes that this practice “reflect[s] nothing more than the
outlook of the capitalist with regard to the conditions of production… it enters the
workplace not as the representative of science, but as the representative of

7

Stone. Widgets to Digits. 27-30.
Stone. Widgets to Digits. 27-30.
9
Stone. Widgets to Digits. 28-35.
10
Stone. Widgets to Digits. 28-35.
8
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management masquerading in the trappings of science.”11 Braverman believes that
scientific management is nothing more than a mechanism deployed to satisfy the needs
of employers at the expense of workers. During the same period, personnel
management, the other side of scientific management’s coin, offered employers a
solution to high employee turnover: safety nets and internal promotion schemes. In a
workplace utilizing personnel management, workers could expect proper job
classification, wage standardization, and rationalization of wage structures. Some
industrialists also offered promotional opportunities, where workers could climb a firm’s
internal hierarchy. Therefore, being hired to the lowest level job came with the possibility
of climbing the ranks to a more desirable position with higher compensation.12
Where scientific management depersonalized the industrial workplace, personnel
management offered solace in the form of a better work environment. Personnel
management paved the way for Fordism, a 20th century production process where lowskill workers were motivated by the prospect of relatively high wages, benefits, social
services, and a policy that “mitigated against frivolous or arbitrary dismissals.”13 The 20th
century industrial process was the country’s first major step towards balancing the
demands of the market with the needs of employees. The role industrial unions played
in institutionalizing Fordism is critical, and will be discussed at length in a later section in
this Thesis, but for current purposes it is simply worth noting that many low-skill
industrial workers in the 20th century felt dignified by their employment relationships
relative to the early Industrial era. The advent of Fordism signified a shift in employer-

11

Braverman, Harry. Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century.
New York: Monthly Review, 1975. Print. 59.
12
Stone. Widgets to Digits. 38-42.
13
Stone. Widgets to Digits. 44-46.
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employee relationships where workers continued to occupy a subordinate role within the
firm but were treated as collaborators rather than disposable commodities.
Industrial workers in the postwar American economy found its labor market both
predictable and understandable. Workers could rely on institutional norms and
expectations about what they received from the firm at which they were employed. One
major norm, “the firm as family,” ensured that “seniority, not individual merit, played a
key role in wages, in which job duties were tightly specified by contract” and, while
layoffs were tolerated, most were “followed by recall” (where terminated workers are
summoned back to work). Again, unions played a crucial role in institutionalizing these
norms, but nonunion firms also adopted such practices. For example, IBM established
direct relations with its employees so workers could voice grievances. IBM employees
could also expect their job to come with a “strong implicit job security commitment.”14 A
plethora of union and nonunion firms operated under the assumption that the employer
and employee shared a long-term commitment.15 The employee’s career was defined
by the enterprise that employed him or her.
During this period, firms faced external pressure in the form of wage
determination. Not only did the laws of supply and demand dictate the average wagerates in a given industry, but employees also expected different levels of pay based on
skill and seniority. Furthermore, in order for a firm to attract workers, it had to set wagerates that correlated with those set by peer firms. Broader economic indicators, like the
unemployment rate or product market developments, also influenced wage-rates.
Finally, a firm’s own balance sheet played a role in wage determination: generally
14

Osterman, Paul. Securing Prosperity: The American Labor Market: How It Has Changed and What to
Do about It. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1999. 20-25.
15
Osterman. Securing Prosperity. 20-25.
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speaking, when a firm was more profitable, the expectation was that employers would
share those increased profits with employees.16 The factors dictating wage
determination during the postwar Industrial era depict an era of predictability. Wage
structures were reliable and slow to adjust to conventional economic forces. Workers
employed by such firms expected both long-term commitment and wage stability, which
ensured security when it came to their own livelihood.
From a structural perspective, there were some key players that helped to
establish stable employer-employee relationships. First, and as previously mentioned,
unions played a crucial role by not only advocating for the workers they represented but
by also pushing nonunion firms to adhere to similar standards due to the “threat effect,”
in which nonunion firms acquiesced to the demands of employees in order to dissuade
them from unionizing. Unions set standards for how firms in a given industry should
orient themselves. Second, American corporate governance operates in a way that
gives stockholders leverage in dictating firm behavior. During the postwar industrial era,
“the ownership of stock was widely dispersed, and boards of directors provided very
little effective oversight.” In short, stock ownership was less concentrated and when
stockholders did exert influence they typically stressed firm growth as a whole rather
than cost-cutting. Finally, the United States government played a role in influencing the
labor-market by providing low-wage workers with increased access to public education.
It is worth noting, however, that the United States government did not play as active a
role in the labor market as European governments.17

16

Osterman. Securing Prosperity. 27-29.
Osterman. Securing Prosperity. 29-31.
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It’s important to re-iterate that 20th century industrialism and Fordism established
structural norms that created a virtuous cycle in the American economy. In the case of
Henry Ford, his employees were paid generous wages so they could afford the cars
they manufactured on the assembly line. Fordist wage-setting practices weren’t
altruistic; they benefited both the worker and the firm. Policies enacted during the New
Deal allowed workers to “keep a sizable portion of the pie that resulted from
mechanization and increased productivity.”18 Workers played an important and distinct
role in ensuring increased productivity and in return they were assured “higher wages…
a measure of job security as well as health care, a decent retirement [plan] and other
worker protections” like sick pay, worker’s compensation, and unemployment
insurance.19
By creating an environment in which employees received desirable
compensation, firms helped establish a middle-class that could reliably consume the
goods they produced. The so-called virtuous cycle didn’t only work to the advantage of
employers and employees, it served as the backbone for unparalleled economic growth
in the mass-market American economy. Today’s policy-makers fondly remember the
Fordist era. Virginia Senator Mark Warner frequently speaks of his father who, when
returning from World War II, worked at the same company for 40 years. He earned
“steady advancement over his career… [his] family was economically secure through a
social contract with his [father’s] employer: defined benefits like health care and other

18

Hill, Steven. Raw Deal: How the "Uber Economy" and Runaway Capitalism Are Screwing American
Workers. New York: St. Martin's, 2015. 160.
19
Hill. Raw Deal. 158-160.
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insurance, and the promise of a decent and dignified retirement.”20 Unfortunately, the
virtuous cycle that characterized the postwar Industrial era grew frayed by the end of
the 20th century. Workers today face an eroding social contract not dissimilar to the
experiences of skilled workers at the end of the Artisanal era.
Since the 1970s, more and more American workers have gravitated towards
precarious work, which is defined as “work that is insecure and uncertain, and in which
the worker – rather than the employer or the government – bears most risks associated
with employment.”21 There are a few quantitative techniques used to capture the growth
of precarious employment. One indicator is employee tenure: the average length of time
an individual spends with his or her employer. Since the 1970s, employee tenure has
declined for men in the private sector in particular.22 More specifically, in 1993 the
median years of tenure for American men was 12.8 years. In 1998 it was 9.4 years.23
Another indicator of increasing precarity is the proportion of workers who suffer from
long-term unemployment. Nearly a quarter of unemployed workers following the 2001
recession suffered from long-term joblessness. One source argues that the high-rate of
long-term unemployment is due to both sluggish rates of job growth and the challenges
faced by displaced industrial workers.24 An additional indicator of growing precarity is
the increasing rate of nonstandard work arrangements including contracting and
temporary work. The temporary help agency sector grew “at an annual rate of over 11%

20

Warner, Mark. "Public Policy Challenges and Opportunities in a Digital Economy." The Huffington Post.
TheHuffingtonPost.com, 09 July 2015.
21
Marsden, Peter V. Social Trends in American Life: Findings from the General Social Survey since 1972.
Princeton: Princeton UP, 2012. 315
22
Marsden. Social Trends in American Life. 315-318.
23
Osterman. Securing Prosperity. 42.
24
Marsden. Social Trends in American Life. 318-319.
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from 1972 to the late 1990s.”25 The final and potentially most significant indicator of
increasing precarity is the shifting of risk from employers to employees. A good marker
for this shift is the movement from defined benefit plans, where an employer guarantees
their employees a certain level of benefits, towards defined contribution plans, where
“employers pay a fixed premium and employees assume the remaining risk.”26 When
taking all four indicators into account, it is clear that workers have experienced a
significant shift towards precarious employment arrangements since the 1970s.
Americans engaged in precarious work arrangements suffer from increased job
and economic insecurity, structural job dislocation, and overall job dissatisfaction.
According to the General Social Survey, the trend towards increasing job insecurity from
1970 to the mid-2000s correlates with rising unemployment rates. When controlling for
the unemployment rate, the “odds of perceiving greater risk of job loss [grew] by an
estimated 1.5% per year between 1977 and 2006… the odds of being at risk of a costly
job loss [grew] by nearly 2% per year.”27 Some have argued that the increasing
perception of insecurity is a result of macrostructural conditions that have provoked
overall labor force precarity. There is also evidence that growing precarity does not only
lead to greater job insecurity but also a “general increase in economic insecurity” as a
whole.28 Decreasing expectations of a long-term employment relationship with a single
employer has given rise to a workforce defined by insecurity.
Professor Paul Osterman has argued that transformation of the American labor
market during the latter-half of the 20th century can be characterized in two ways:

25

Marsden. Social Trends in American Life. 319.
Marsden. Social Trends in American Life. 318-319.
27
Marsden. Social Trends in American Life. 324.
28
Marsden. Social Trends in American Life. 321-335.
26
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increased mobility in the labor force and the shifting balance of power between
employers and employees.29 Osterman offers a convincing argument by demonstrating
that, despite an improving economy in the 1990s, the rate of job dislocation trended
upwards. In 1994, roughly 12% of all workers experienced dislocation whereas roughly
13% of workers did in 1996.30 Osterman also cites the rise of contingent work - an
employment arrangement where “the employee lacks the level of job security a given
employer” grants a traditional employee - as cause for concern.31 From 1991 to 1996,
the fastest growing American industry was “Personnel Supply Services,” the industry
responsible for brokering temporary workers.32 Furthermore, census data indicates that,
of all the jobs created between 1988 and 1996, 22% were in “business services and
engineering/management services… [that] provide contract and contingent labor.”33
Osterman is troubled by the increased deployment of contingent workers because it
embodies America’s macrostructural transition towards precarious employment
relationships. Increased precarity also has major ramifications in terms of social
services: America’s health and pension infrastructure is predicated on the assumption of
a long-term commitment between a firm and a worker.
The mechanisms through which American workers receive social services acts
as the bedrock for what some have called a “psychological contract.” The postwar
psychological contract implied that both parties in an employment relationship held
certain expectations about what that relationship entailed. During this era, “the employer
was seen as a caretaker for the employee… [productive workers] were virtually
29

Osterman. Securing Prosperity. 4-5.
Osterman. Securing Prosperity. 45-48.
31
Osterman. Securing Prosperity. 54.
32
Osterman. Securing Prosperity. 56.
33
Osterman. Securing Prosperity. 54-56.
30
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guaranteed a job by their employer until retirement… [and] the employer [offered their
workforce] career development and promotions and [in return] the employee gave
loyalty and commitment to the” firm.34 However, as the American labor force drifted
towards precarity, the postwar psychological contract began to erode. Thus enters a
new psychological contract where “both employees and employers have lower
expectations for long-term employment, employees are responsible for their own career
development, and commitment to the work has replaced commitment to the job and
organization.”35 The new psychological contract serves as the bedrock for a different
kind of employment landscape, where workers are devoted to their own accumulation of
human capital rather than an individual firm. As previously discussed, America’s social
insurance system isn’t equipped to guarantee security for workers who adhere to the
new psychological contract. Today, a worker’s primary provider for health coverage,
pensions, disability, and long-term care is their employer, not the government. The new
and increasingly mobile employment landscape “contributes to the erosion of the social
safety net… as employees move from job to job, they typically lose whatever employersponsored benefits they once had.”36 This predicament spells potential catastrophe for
workers operating under the new psychological contract.
Economic developments in the 21st century have stoked increasing mobility in the
labor market. According to a report released by the Freelancers Union, many
contemporary workers subscribe to a “eggs-in-many-baskets” strategy due in part to the
accessibility of social networking technologies, the Great Recession disrupting the
presumed stability of traditional work arrangements, and increased global competition
34

Stone. Widgets to Digits. 91.
Stone. Widgets to Digits. 90-91.
36
Stone. Widgets to Digits. 244-245.
35
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for white-collar work.37 While one should hesitate to draw a correlative or causal
relationship between the Great Recession and a spike in precarious employment, even
members of the Government Accountability Office acknowledge that an increase in the
amount of part-time and temporary work coincided with the Great Recession.38 Some
policymakers, like Virginia Senator Mark Warner, argue that changing employeremployee dynamics offer opportunities for freedom and flexibility in the labor market,
but at the same time, precarious work arrangements “do not provide traditional safety
net protections for workers” like unemployment insurance, workers’ compensation, or
pension and retirement planning.39 The drift towards labor market precarity during the
latter half of the 20th century has not only persisted, but intensified, in the 21st century.
One study shows that non-permanent - also known as contingent - workers have grown
from 17% of the overall workforce to 36% in the past 25 years. The study also portends
that, by 2020, these workers will account for 43% of the overall workforce.40 If such
forecasts are correct, then by 2020, nearly half of the American workforce will be
excluded from the safety net that served to protect the majority of workers in the
postwar industrial era.
Currently, it is unclear how many Americans are engaged in nontraditional
employment arrangements. A later section of this Thesis will discuss the lack of
accurate data concerning the size of the contingent workforce, but for current purposes,
it is important to depict the environment in which contingent workers operate.
37

Freelancers Union & Upwork. "Freelancing In America: 2015." An Independent Study Commissioned by
Freelancers Union & Upwork (2015). 01 Oct. 2015. 4.
38
Interview with Members of the Government Accountability Office." Interview by Ziya Smallens. 21 Oct.
2015.
39
"Gig Economy." Mark R. Warner: U.S. Senator from the Commonwealth of Virginia. Senator Mark
Warner, 2015. Web.
40
Townsend, Tess. "Study Says Work Force Shifting Increasingly Toward Freelance." Inc.com. Inc., 13
Aug. 2015.
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Contingent workers, when compared with traditional employees, earn about 10.6% less
per hour. When not controlling for hours worked, they earn about 27.5% less per week
and 47.9% less per year than traditional employees.41 Considering that contingent
workers, unlike traditional employees, are not guaranteed vital benefits like worker’s
compensation or health insurance, a fairly stark image comes to view. According to the
General Social Survey, in 2010 40.4% of the American workforce was engaged in an
“alternative work arrangement,” up from 35.3% in 2006.42 An alternative work
arrangement is not analogous to contingent work, as this categorization includes selfemployed and standard part-time workers, but this statistical trend further confirms what
has been discussed up to this point: the American workforce is continuously drifting
towards precarity and instability.4344 Some private firms have also published reports
refuting the statistics provided by the federal government. Those reports will be
discussed in greater detail in a later section of this Thesis.
Corporations have increasingly relied on contingent workers in order to cut costs.
In the 1990s, managers viewed contingent workers as a substitute to outsourced labor,
because they “provide firm flexibility in reconfiguring resource deployment… and reduce
response times to major environmental changes.”45 In a 1998 report released by The
Academy of Management, one researcher argues that “we appear to be racing toward a

41

"Contingent Workforce: Size, Characteristics, Earnings, and Benefits." GAO. GAO: U.S. Government
Accountability Office, 20 Apr. 2015. 6.
42
"Contingent Workforce: Size, Characteristics, Earnings, and Benefits." GAO. GAO: U.S. Government
Accountability Office, 20 Apr. 2015. 4.
43
"Contingent Workforce: Size, Characteristics, Earnings, and Benefits." GAO. GAO: U.S. Government
Accountability Office, 20 Apr. 2015.
44
Weber, Lauren. "New Data Spotlights Changes in the U.S. Workforce." The Wall Street Journal. The
Wall Street Journal, 28 May 2015
45
Hitt, M. A., Keats, B. W., and Demarie, S. M. "Navigating in the New Competitive Landscape: Building
Strategic Flexibility and Competitive Advantage in the 21st Century." Academy of Management
Perspectives 12.4 (1998): 22-42. 29.
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protean, freelance economy in which a typical company will consist of a small core of
long-term employees… surrounded by an ever changing cloud of” temporary workers.46
Contingent labor grants firms increased flexibility, not only in cutting costs, but also in
shifting the size of their workforces. It is far easier to terminate a contingent worker than
a standard one, and in a globalized economy, managers seek to reduce risk any way
they can. Contingent labor offers firms short-term solutions to corporate crises and
resource deficiencies but few safeguards for the workers themselves. In a 2015 report,
the Bureau of Labor Statistics outlined the general cost difference for full-time and parttime employees. According to the report, “employer retirement and savings benefit costs
for full-time workers in private industry averaged $1.57 per hour worked (4.3% of total
compensation), [which is] significantly higher than 32 cents for part-time workers (2.0
percent).”47 Hiring a full-time employee is substantially more expensive than hiring a
part-time or contingent worker.
As prospects for full-time employment fade, workers operating under the new
psychological contract are forced to cover the costs of protections employers typically
provide. Some analysts have categorized the nonstandard portion of the labor force as
the “1099 economy,” referring to the fact that workers operating outside of traditional
employer-employee relationships don’t file W-2 tax forms with the IRS. Instead, they file
the 1099-MISC form, which classifies them as “independent contractors.”48 In 2010, the
IRS received roughly 82 million 1099-MISC forms; in 2014 that number climbed to 91
million. The number of 1099 forms being filed, since 1989, is greater than the number of
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W-2s.49 Business owners warmly welcome this development because, when a given
workforce files 1099 instead of W-2 tax forms, labor costs can be reduced by 30% or
more.50 1099 workers are only paid for the specific number of hours they work, so the
“extraneous” parts of a conventional employee’s workday – time spent in the bathroom
or at the water cooler – incur no additional cost to the firm.51 Rather than being paid by
the hour, 1099 workers are paid for the tasks they complete on a piecemeal basis.
A worker who files a 1099 tax form is forced to cover the employer’s portion of
the Social Security and Medicare payroll tax. This deducts an extra 8% from an
individual’s income annually. These workers also face higher health-care premiums
because they are not part of a larger health-care pool. Researcher Steven Hill argues
that long-term 1099 workers can be referred to as “perma-temps.” These are workers
who are technically private contractors but whose day-to-day duties reflect those of a
traditional employee. They perform many of the same tasks but are provided none of
the benefits that traditional employees receive. The United States plays host to more
temporary workers, individuals deployed by “employee leasing firms,” than ever before
– 2% of the overall workforce – and the increasing reliance on perma-temps, Hill
argues, can be considered a form of “domestic outsourcing.”52 Rather than shipping
jobs overseas, jobs are now outsourced domestically via contingent work. These
workers occupy many positions that used to be filled by full- or part-time workers.
Corporations deploying perma-temps, like Nissan, have effectively abandoned the old
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psychological contract that implied a long-term commitment between a firm and its
workers.
The American safety net that defined employment relationships in the postwar
Industrial era is slowly becoming an anachronism. Key forms of social insurance
operate under the assumption that American workers are engaged in an employment
relationship best defined by loyalty. In today’s economic climate, most firms do not
operate as a family, and this is due largely to macrostructural shifts in the global
economy. Firms face more competition and there is more pressure for managers to cut
costs. This Thesis will investigate how macrostructural trends since the mid-20th century
have been magnified by the advent of the Gig and On-Demand economy. Even board
members of major On-Demand platforms, like President Obama’s former campaign
manager David Plouffe, recognize that the growth of America’s contingent workforce is
troubling and that we, as a society, “should be careful not to accelerate [this] trend.”53
The paradigm defining American employment relationships has undergone a
shift. Despite the significant drift towards precarity, the assumptions that underlie the
relationship “between businesses and workers - and the benefits and protections that
have evolved to support this relationship - have not kept pace with the rapid changes”
workers have experienced.54 With a new psychological contract comes new
expectations that have yet to be codified. The next section of this Thesis will dig deeper
into the number of American workers operating outside of the traditional employment
landscape.
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a. A Note on Terminology
A major focal point for this Thesis is the structural transformation of American
employment relationships. For this reason, many terms have been utilized by various
sources to refer to different employment relationships. A glossary is included at the end
of this Thesis, which clarifies the different terms employed, but at this point in time, a
brief overview of two of the most common terms, The Gig and On-Demand economy, is
necessary.
The Gig economy refers to the American contingent workforce in the 21st
century. Rather than being employed by a single employer in a committed and longterm employer-employee relationship, Gig workers are subjected to a more marginal,
and at times somewhat tenuous, relationship with managers. Gig workers work job-tojob with multiple firms and/or managers; they accrue their income, at least partially, from
various sources, rather than a single place of work. These workers perform a variety of
tasks, sometimes even in multiple industries. On Monday, a given Gig worker could
work for a landscaping company and on Wednesday they could tutor high school
students.
The On-Demand economy is an off-shoot of the Gig economy, where app-based
platforms serve to punctuate the contingent nature of this sector of the economy. In the
On-Demand economy, contingent work is facilitated by app-based platforms like Uber,
Airbnb, and TaskRabbit. These platforms match workers with consumers seeking
services on a task-by-task basis. The following section will primarily discuss the Gig
workforce at large, because most statistics collected by the federal government or
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private firms are concerned with the overall contingent workforce. Very little data has
been collected on On-Demand workers exclusively.

II.

Flaws in Past Measurements of the Contingent Workforce
Calculating the size of the Gig and On-Demand workforce is a labyrinthine task.

The Government Accountability Office published a report in 2015 which sought to
estimate the size of the contingent workforce but the results are underwhelming.
According to the report, contingent workers comprise somewhere between 5% and 30%
of the overall labor force. One issue researchers ran into is the definition of contingent
work. The conservative estimate (closer to 5%) is drawn from a definition that focuses
on the duration of employment whereas the broader estimate (closer to 30%) is drawn
from a definition that focuses on the non-traditional nature of this category of work. As a
closing observation, the report asserts that current discourse surrounding the size of the
contingent workforce is “shaped to some extent by both a scarcity of some types of data
and an overabundance of other types of data.”55
During a phone call with two members of the GAO, I asked for further elaboration
on the insufficiency of federal data. They cited a couple reasons. First, the Bureau of
Labor Statistics has not conducted the contingent work supplement, the primary survey
on contingent work, since 2005, which predates the advent of the On-Demand
economy. Furthermore, surveys conducted by the federal government rely on
employment categorizations that have not been refined for the modern app-based
employment environment. The frequency of data collection is subpar and the existing
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data is imprecisely categorized.56 “The data is totally worthless,” says Senator Mark
Warner.57 According to federal statistics, there could be anywhere between 3 and 53
million contingent workers in the labor force.58 Federal data fails to even capture the
existence of the On-Demand economy. The Associate Commissioner for Employment
and Unemployment Statistics at the BLS admits that the federal government fails to
offer a “simple accounting of all of the various types of worker arrangements” in the
American economy.59
The methods the federal government employs to collect labor force data are
anachronistic. An anonymous employee in the U.S. Senate notes that “we’ve struggled
with a lack of data… the markers are not well defined… and the categories don’t apply
to today’s workforce.”60 Some individuals working within the federal government have
advocated for agencies like the IRS, the BLS, and the United States Census Bureau to
aggregate their data and collaborate in their attempts to account for and categorize
American workers in the 21st century. There is also ample opportunity for private firms,
like LinkedIn, and academic Institutions, like Harvard or MIT, to contribute to the debate
- in fact, some institutions already have.61 Unfortunately, it seems that the BLS will not
be able to bolster its data-gathering apparatus in the near future as forthcoming
legislation in the Senate has proposed millions of dollars in cuts to the agency. The
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agency’s annual spending has already decreased by ~10% since 2010.62 It’s likely that
underfunding the BLS will further diminish its capacity to capture statistically significant
shifts in America’s labor force.
According to federal data, “the share of people who hold multiple jobs is… in
decline.” As of the 2015, the percentage of American workers who hold multiple jobs is
4.8%. That’s down from 5.5% in 2005 and 6.3% in 1995.63 Other statistics, like the
growing number of workers filing 1099 tax forms rather than W-2s, challenge this
conclusion. There is a fundamental lack of coherence when it comes to the
government’s data mining infrastructure. Many experts argue that the statistics provided
by the BLS are simply not reliable. According to researcher Steven Hill, underground
economic activity in 2012 accounted for $2 trillion, or 13%, of the country’s GDP.64 That
is double the number in 2009 - just three years prior. He also notes that, in recent years,
while the number of unemployed individuals has decreased, the official rate of
employed Americans stands at its lowest level since 1983.65 Hill argues that both of
these statistical anomalies can be chalked up to the fact that “the current [data
gathering] methodologies are particularly unsuited for today’s fragmenting labor force”
primarily because the BLS utilizes employment surveys that originated in 1940s, during
the peak of postwar employment arrangements. Individuals who work outside of that
paradigm are simply “invisible.”66
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Recently, some private sector firms have attempted to calculate the size of the
Gig and On-Demand workforce. In 2015, the Freelancers Union collaborated with
Elance-oDesk to publish a comprehensive survey on the size of the “new workforce.”67
The Freelancers Union offers a wide variety of services to non-permanent workers in
the American workforce which will be discussed in further detail in a later section of this
Thesis. Their survey, Freelancers in America, defines a freelancer as an individual who
has “engaged in supplemental, temporary, or project- or contract-based work in the past
12 months.”68 Under their framework, a freelancer is a refined characterization of a
contingent worker; the definition employed by the Freelancers Union is simply tailored to
the organization’s particular interests. According to the survey, 53 million Americans
(34% of the U.S. workforce) are working as freelancers. 32% of freelancers surveyed
have noticed an increase in demand for their services in the past year while 15% have
noticed a decrease. The survey also argues that freelancers added $715 billion to the
economy in the past year.69
It is critical to note that surveys conducted by private firms like the Freelancers
Union are not infallible. It is in the firm’s best interest to inflate the significance of the
work their members perform. That being said, the BLS recently recruited Sara Horowitz,
the founder of the Freelancers Union, to write a blog post on the agency’s website. Her
post reaffirms the claims made in the survey, particularly that 53 million Americans work
as freelancers.70 Still, the BLS is not necessarily endorsing the numbers provided by
Horowitz, but rather providing a platform for leaders in the Gig and On-Demand
67

Greenhouse, Steven. "Tackling Concerns of Independent Workers." The New York Times. The New
York Times, 23 Mar. 2013. Web.
68
Freelancers Union & Upwork. "Freelancing In America: 2015." 3.
69
Freelancers Union & Upwork. "Freelancing In America: 2015."
70
Horowitz, Sara. "Freelancers in the U.S. Workforce." U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics, Oct. 2015. Web.

28

economy. The BLS isn’t validating the Freelancers Union’s numbers, but they aren’t
refuting them either. In 2015, a group of business and labor leaders in the Gig and OnDemand economy penned an open letter calling for a slate of public policy proposals to
reform the institutional mechanisms through which workers receive protections. The
letter also cites the numbers provided by the Freelancers Union, arguing that roughly 53
million Americans work as freelancers.71 The Freelancers Union’s claims are perceived
as credible among many leaders in the Gig and On-Demand economy.
Another private firm throwing their hat in the statistical ring is MBO Partners.
MBO Partners provides self-employed individuals the opportunity to connect with other
consultants as well as potential clients. As a platform, it helps provide “Independents”
opportunities to find work.72 In their fifth annual report, MBO Partners attempted to
calculate the number of “Independents” in the American economy. Similar to the
Freelancers Union’s definition of freelancers, they define “Independents” as Americans
“of all ages, skill, and income levels who turn to freelancing, contract work, consulting,
temporary assignments or on-call work regularly each week for income, opportunity and
satisfaction.”73 According to their data, the number of independent workers in the United
States has grown 12% in the past five years. In 2015, they argue, the number of
Independents aged 21 or older “held firm at 30.2 million.”74 The numerical estimates
provided by MBO Partners may be lower than the Freelancers Union’s, but they
contend that the economic impact of Independents is still substantial. Where the
Freelancers Union credited under a trillion dollars in economic activity to freelancers,
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MBO Partners argue that these workers generate more than $1.15 trillion in revenue nearly 7% of the country’s GDP.75 Their report is highly optimistic about the growth of
gig work: according to their calculations, the independent workforce is growing at a rate
that is “more than four times greater [than] the growth of the overall workforce.”76
Perhaps the most reliable non-public sector resource to conduct a poll gauging
the size of the Gig and On-Demand economy is Time magazine. In December 2015,
Time collaborated with strategic communications and global public relations firm
Burson-Marsteller, along with the Aspen Institute Future of Work Initiative, to poll 3,000
individuals. According to their results, 22% of U.S. adults - 45 million people - have
“offered some kind of good or service” in the Gig and On-Demand economy.77
Additionally, 44% of U.S. adults “have participated in such transactions, playing the
roles of lenders and borrowers, drivers and riders, hosts and guests.”78 That’s more
than 90 million people - a number larger than the number of Americans who identify as
Republican or Democrat. The numbers provided by Time demonstrate that the Gig and
On-Demand economy is much more pervasive than some assume. Its economic impact
is not only derived from the number of individuals working through platforms like Uber or
Airbnb but also by the millions of Americans turning to such platforms for goods and
services. The Freelancers Union, MBO Partners, and TIME all argue that a major
transformation is taking place - some even compare it to the Industrial Revolution.79
Once again, it is important to remember that these firms do not play a disinterested role.
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This is especially true for the Freelancers Union and MBO Partners: their profitability
depends on growing activity in this sector of the economy.
While On-Demand platforms play a pivotal role in the overall Gig economy, the
three surveys discussed thus far do not provide a nuanced view towards the OnDemand economy itself. Steve King, a researcher who analyzes small business
economy at Emergent Research, has been trying to pinpoint the economic clout of OnDemand platforms. In an interview conducted with Mr. King, he provided some numbers
from a forthcoming study to be published by Emergent Research: there are 3.2 million
workers in the On-Demand economy in particular. However, 79% of those workers work
part-time - less than 35 hours per week - while the remaining number work full-time.80
Other researchers have made a similar observation: at Uber, most drivers utilize the
service as a means to earn supplementary income.81
The previous section of this Thesis cited the growing number of 1099-MISC tax
forms as an indicator of a growing non-permanent American workforce. Since 2000, the
number of individuals filing 1099 forms has grown by 22%. During that same period, the
number of W-2 forms being filed has stagnated, falling by roughly 3.5%.82 What’s more,
in 2010, the IRS received about 82 million 1099 forms; in 2014 the agency received 91
million.83 Many sources have pointed to this trend as an indicator that the Gig economy
has grown at a troubling rate.84 A forthcoming study to be published by professors Alan
Krueger and Lawrence Katz indicates that, since 2005, “the number of workers in
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alternative arrangements has climbed by more than half, rising to nearly 16% of the
workforce from 10% a decade ago.”85 The same study notes that the On-Demand
economy, whilst growing, has yet to significantly impact the American labor market.
However, statistics clearly indicate that the overall Gig economy is rapidly growing;
seeing as the On-Demand economy occupies a unique role within the overall Gig
economy, app-based platforms are working to perpetuate a structural drift towards labor
market precarity. Due to a dearth of data, the extent of their influence, in this regard, is
unclear.
If the statistics outlined thus far make one point clear it is that the Gig and OnDemand has grown alongside a structural shift towards precarity in the American labor
force. Federal statistics have failed to accurately depict this transformation and surveys
conducted by private firms present a macro-level perspective. At the time of writing this,
Secretary of Labor Tom Perez has just announced that the BLS will team up with the
Census Bureau to revive the Contingent Worker Supplement for the first time since
2005. His goal is to provide lawmakers with “reliable, credible insight into what’s going
on across a range of work arrangements – from independent contractors to temporary
employees to workers holding multiple jobs at the same time.”86 Members of the federal
government, at the highest level, are finally recognizing that the conventional methods
of surveying the American workforce are no longer sufficient.
Millions of Americans, somewhere between 30-50 million, are engaging with the
Gig and On-Demand economy in some capacity. At least a couple million are seeking

85

Sussman, Anna Louie, and Zumbrun, Josh. "Contract Workforce Outpaces Growth in Silicon-Valley
Style 'Gig' Jobs." WSJ. The Wall Street Journal, 25 Mar. 2016. Web.
86
Perez, Tom. "Innovation and the Contingent Workforce." U.S. Department of Labor Blog: Promoting &
Protecting Opportunity. United States Department of Labor, 25 Jan. 2016. Web.

32

some form of work - whether part- or full-time - through On-Demand platforms. Who are
they?

III.

Definitions of Workers and Exchanges in The Gig and On-Demand
Economy
a. Who Works in This Sector of the Economy?
The federal government has done a woefully inadequate job at classifying

and categorizing Americans engaged in non-permanent or alternative work
arrangements. As previously discussed, the government has only scratched the surface
in regards to the risks these workers face. The GAO summarizes that “contingent work
tends to lead to lower earnings, fewer benefits… and a greater reliance on public
assistance…. [and] contingent workers earn about 10.6 percent less per hour than
standard workers.87 Both the GAO and BLS offer a slate of contingent work
classifications based on past data. According to their statistics, there are seven types of
contingent workers: Agency temps, Direct-hire temps, On-call workers and day laborers,
Contract company workers, Independent contractors, Self-employed workers, and
Standard part-time workers. The first four categories - Agency and Direct-hire temps,
On-Call workers and day laborers, and Contract company workers - comprise what the
GAO and BLS refer to as “core contingent workers,” meaning workers that most
accurately represent the precarious and nonpermanent nature of contingent work.
Altogether, from 1995 to 2005, the percentage of contingent workers in the American
workforce held steady. In 1995, 32.2% of American workers were considered contingent
workers. That number fell to 29.9% in 1999 and rose back up to 30.6% by 2005. During
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that same period the number of Core contingent workers hovered between 5.5% and
6% of the workforce. Core contingent workers in particular “are more likely to be
younger, Hispanic, have no high school degree, and have low family income.”88
Under the GAO and BLS’s classifications, the seeds of the Gig and On-Demand
economy are evident. However, it is also apparent that the seven categories - aside
from Independent Contractors or Self-employed workers - cannot be applied to workers
in the contemporary Gig and On-Demand economy. Most definitions provided by the
GAO and BLS operate under the assumption that workers either work with a single
manager or that companies broker nonpermanent workers out to other firms. In the
contemporary Gig and On-Demand economy, workers can be directly recruited by
individuals and they can also work in more than one industry. The Independent
Contractor category is less obtuse as it applies to individuals who “obtain customers on
their own to provide a product or service.” This category has also grown over time, from
6.7% of the workforce in 1995 to 7.4% in 2005.89 One major flaw with the Independent
Contractor category is that it generalizes the experiences of individuals: today, a given
work day for an Independent contractor can vary greatly.
Another category that roughly captures the experiences of Gig and On-Demand
workers is Self-employed workers. Under this category, individuals don’t receive a wage
or salary but also don’t self-identify as Independent contractors, like restaurant or shop
owners. Again, the predominant flaw with the categories outlined by the GAO and BLS
is that they are drawn from a 20th century paradigm for alternative work
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arrangements.90 At no point do they consider the fluid nature or the app-based realm of
the On-Demand economy.
The previous section of this Thesis demonstrated that some of the most
substantive studies concerning the Gig and On-Demand economy have been
conducted by private firms. The 2015 Freelancers in America survey provides an
analysis of the different types of “freelancers” in the American workforce. The study
classifies five types. The first, Independent Contractors, accounts for the largest block of
the freelance workforce (40%) and can best be described as the “traditional freelancer”
who has no employer and performs contingent work on a project-to-project basis. Under
the Freelancers Union’s classifications, 21.1 million Americans identify as Independent
Contractors. 14.3 million individuals (27% of the freelance workforce) classify as
Moonlighters: professionals with a primary job who moonlight performing freelance
work, like web developers who do projects for other companies on the side. 9.3 million
individuals (18% of the freelance workforce) classify as Diversified workers: people who
draw income from multiple sources through both traditional employers and freelance
work, like an individual who works as a receptionist for 20 hours a week and fills the rest
of his or her income by driving for Uber or writing on a freelance basis. 5.5 million
individuals (10% of the freelance workforce) classify as Temporary Workers: Individuals
with a single employer, client, job or contract project where their employment status is
temporary, for instance, someone who works as a business strategy consultant on a
client-by-client basis for months at a time. Finally, 2.8 million individuals (5% of the
freelance workforce) classify as Freelance Business Owners: business owners who
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manage between one to five employees. They consider themselves as both a freelancer
and a business owner, like a social marketing guru who hires a small team to build an
agency.91
The Freelancers Union offers a slate of categories that is much more insightful
than any analysis offered by the federal government. While not perfect, the five
categories outlined in the study do capture the general spectrum of work in the
emerging Gig and On-Demand economy as well as acknowledge the impact of OnDemand platforms in transforming the way individuals seek opportunities for
supplementary, or even primary, income. However, none of the categories outlined by
the Freelancers Union are exclusively concerned with the On-Demand economy.
The job-scheduling process in the On-Demand economy is distinct from that of
the overall Gig economy. In the Gig economy, scores of workers are deployed through
temp agencies (Temporary Workers) or bounce job-to-job in a single industry
(Independent Contractors). In the On-Demand economy, workers are not assigned
duties by a larger organization. Instead, On-Demand workers exhibit relative autonomy
in scheduling their workday. They choose when and where they work and, depending
on their platform(s) of choice, in which industry. On-Demand platforms present workers
with a range of employment opportunities that they can choose from. In a single day, a
given On-Demand worker could spend three hours driving for Uber and four hours
working as an editor through TaskRabbit. Such workers are not, in theory, held
dominion to a single firm or industry. The Freelancers Union offers one category - the
Diversified worker – that could apply to On-Demand employment arrangements, but this
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category still implies that workers are tied to traditional industries, which is not always
the case.
In many ways, the Gig and On-Demand economy presents new opportunities for
the American workforce, but it also presents familiar flaws. In the view of Steven Hill, the
Gig and On-Demand economy is an extension of what he calls the “grey economy”
where discouraged workers are driven towards working “under the table” rather than
through traditional employment schemes. Data presented in the next section of this
Thesis will challenge this point, but again, the same data is offered by firms that have
reasons to depict a rosier picture than may be true. As a “1099 employee” - which fulltime freelancers, independents, and Gig workers file as - workers are taxed double for
Social Security and Medicare. In terms of taxation, they are compelled to play the role of
both the employer and employee.92 They must provide for their own healthcare,
retirement, and they must deduct their own income tax and mail it to the IRS. This issue
speaks to a larger characteristic of the Gig and On-Demand economy: the lack of
regulation.

b. Subjective Experiences of Gig and On-Demand Workers
Whilst my analysis has found that the collapse of full-time and secure
employment prospects has driven workers towards the Gig Economy, evidence also
suggests that opportunities offered in this sector of the economy can potentially satisfy
the needs and desires of displaced workers. According to the Freelancers in America
survey, the most common reasons cited for freelancing is to “earn extra money” (68%)
and to “have flexibility in [one’s] schedule” (42%). More than half of freelancers began
freelancing due to personal choice, rather than financial necessity (53%). The biggest
92
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obstacles Freelancers face is a lack of stable income and the process of finding work;
however, respondents note that new technology makes both obstacles less daunting.93
Respondents also note some other obstacles, such as getting paid on time
(31%), knowing what skills are in demand (23%), the availability of affordable benefits
(21%), and paperwork and administrative overhead (13%). One of the most fascinating
statistics is that 77% of respondents believe that the best days of their freelancing
careers are ahead of them.94 As thorough as the study is, it’s important to be cautious
when working with data provided by private firms that have incentives to broadcast an
optimistic portrayal of the Gig and On-Demand economy. Nonetheless, the Freelancers
Union, whilst making broad and even hyperbolic claims, does illustrate the range of
experiences for those working in the Gig and On-Demand economy.
The MBO Partners study published in 2015 also offers an in-depth view of
different forms of nonpermanent, firm-to-firm work in the American economy. According
to their data, 58% of respondents chose “independent work” by choice rather than
necessity. 45% note that they make more money in this work arrangement than they
would in a traditional one. Of the roughly 32 million Americans partaking in Independent
work, 17.8 million do it full-time (more than 35 hours per week) and 12.4 million do it
part-time. MBO Partners argues that there is potential for 30-45% of the nonfarm
workforce to join the Independent workforce by 2020. In 2015, 43% of full-time
Independents felt more “secure” than they would in a traditional work arrangement;
that’s up from 33% in 2011.95 The term “security” is ambiguous, but Steve King from
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Emergent Research elaborates that security, in this context, refers to “employment
security… [due to the fact that this form of work allows for] multiple income streams.”96
Some Independent workers, including many millennials who make up 30% of fulltime “Independents,” believe that this work arrangement allows oneself to dilute the
threat of losing work, an eggs-in-many-baskets strategy. Nearly all of the respondents
who identify as part-timers (91%) rely on a traditional job in order to maintain a steady
source of income. Furthermore, many part-timers view Independent work as means to
enhance their market value by learning new skills on-the-job; in other words, an
opportunity to acquire more human capital.97 The report argues that millennials are
driving the popularity of Independent work, citing the rapid growth of millennials in the
Gig economy. Millennials accounted for 1.9 million of full-time Independents in 2011
(12% of the total); in 2015 they accounted for 5.35 million (30% of the total). Still, and
seemingly contradictory, millennials express that they are challenged by Independent
work and that they would prefer a traditional job more-so than their non-millennial peers
(29% versus 12%).98
MBO Partners admits that there exists an “unsatisfied” contingent of Independent
workers. These respondents express fears that they are not in control of their careers,
work, work schedules, or workplaces. 28% of all Independent workers would prefer a
full-time payroll job.99 Steve King from Emergent Research - who, again, claims that 3.2
million individuals partake in On-Demand work - insists that “many” On-Demand
workers do not want to be classified as full-time employees. According to him,
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individuals working through platforms like Uber do not wish to be subjected to the
restrictions that comes with employee status; “[in that event] a lot of them will quit,” he
says.100 The statistics offered by MBO Partners demonstrates that the Gig economy is
precarious. A formidable portion of the Independent workforce, especially millennials,
continue to perceive traditional employment as a more sustainable career path.
However, it is also clear that the conditions for Independent workers are improving. Not
only are more and more people turning towards Independent work as a viable career
path (the number of full-timers “has risen from 15.9 million [in 2011] to 17.8 million in
2015” and the number of part-timers rose from “from 12.1 million in 2014 to 12.4 million
in 2015”) but an increasing number of Independent workers believe that it is a more
secure employment arrangement than a traditional one.101
Once again, it’s important to consider that these statistics have been provided by
a private firm rather than an unbiased publicly-funded resource. Perhaps respondents
perceive the Gig economy as more secure due to the fact that traditional career paths
have eroded over the past half-century. It could also be the case that the Gig economy
genuinely entices a significant portion of the labor force. Regardless, both the
Freelancers Union and MBO Partners shed light on this sector of the economy, and the
experiences of those who navigate it, in a way the federal government has failed to.
The study published by Time Magazine also offers insight into the minds of Gig
workers. According to the study, “about one third [of the 45 million gig workers] …
describe it as their primary source of income or say they can’t get work in a more
traditional job.” Such workers also “treasure the liberty” presented by the Gig economy.
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71% of respondents have had a positive experience in the Gig economy while a
shockingly low 2% report having a negative experience. 58% of “offerers” - individuals
who work in or offer services through the Gig economy - believe that the industry is
“exploiting a lack of regulation.” However, 49% of full- and part-time offerers oppose
increased regulation, whereas only 47% of full-time and 36% of part-time offerers favor
increased regulation.102 Time magazine is potentially the most reputable private firm to
publish a in-depth report or study on workers in the Gig and On-Demand economy.
Their data demonstrates that there really is no consensus in terms of how to improve
working conditions in this sector of the economy. Many of these workers are galvanized
by the prospect of having more control over their work life, but this freedom comes with
great uncertainty.
On-Demand firms like Airbnb operate in a way not dissimilar to actors in the “grey
economy.” As a service, Airbnb allows individuals to rent out spare space in their place
of living, whether it be a castle or an apartment. A detailed analysis of Airbnb will be
provided in a later section of this Thesis, but for current purposes, it is important to
demonstrate that the process of becoming a host - an individual who rents space out to
guests - is surprisingly simple. During the exchange, both hosts and guests must use
their real names and their identities can be verified either by presenting drivers licenses
or Facebook profiles. That’s it. That is the extent of the verification process for those
either hosting or renting. Both hosts and guests can be publicly rated on Airbnb’s site
and the prospect of poor user reviews acts as incentive to provide quality service.
Airbnb does offer some protections, and it has been making improvements, but the
bottom-line is that there is a high level of risk. In the words of one columnist, “Airbnb’s
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real innovation is not online rentals. It’s ‘trust.’ It created a framework of trust that has
made tens of thousands of people comfortable renting rooms in their homes to
strangers.”103 But is trust enough? In some cases, no. Take for instance an incident in
Spain where a 19-year old living with an Airbnb host was sexually assaulted.104 Similar
incidents resulting from a lack of regulation have also transpired and will be discussed
in a later section of this Thesis. However, the do-it-yourself quality of services like
Airbnb allow people to commodify skills and goods that, prior to the On-Demand
economy, had little-to-no value in the marketplace. Trust may not be enough to ensure
security for those operating in the Gig and On-Demand economy but its homebrew
nature is also what draws consumers to platforms like Airbnb.

c. How Do We Refer to These Workers?
An exhausting number of terms are thrown around when defining
individuals who work in the Gig and On-Demand economy: Contingent workers,
Freelancers, Independents, nonpermanent workers, 1099 workers, et cetera. The vast
array of overlapping terminology hinders the ability for experts and academics to
discuss the problems these workers face with precision. Luckily, one leading theorist,
Rachel Botsman, published a “dictionary” for the new economy. In it, she provides a
wide-range of definitions spanning from “umbrella terms” that refer to a group of ideas
or characteristics shared by various firms to “market mechanisms” that refer to the way
goods and services are dispensed. In the dictionary, she provides separate definitions
for many terms that other writers and researchers use somewhat interchangeably.
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According to Botsman, the “Gig economy” refers to “systems that break up a
traditional company ‘job’ into individual ‘gigs’ that independent workers are paid to do for
a time.” She refers to the business model of some firms like TaskRabbit which pays
“task runners” for every singular task they perform. The “On-Demand Economy” refers
to “systems that instantly match buyers and sellers to deliver goods and services
immediately when people need them.” In this way, the On-Demand Economy is an offshoot of the overall Gig economy. In the simplest terms, the On-Demand Economy is a
sphere in which gigs are facilitated by app-based platforms and are largely timesensitive. Thus, the On-Demand Economy is inextricably linked with the technology its
very existence depends on.
It’s important to draw a distinction between these two terms and other terms that
have been used to describe the Gig and On-Demand Economy. The “Sharing
Economy” refers to “systems that facilitate the sharing of underused assets or services,
for free or for a fee, directly between individuals or organizations.” Airbnb’s business
model could fall under this category; however, this definition lacks the universality of the
“Gig Economy.” Also, “Collaborative Consumption” refers to “systems that reinvent
traditional market behaviors… in ways and on a scale not possible before the internet.”
This term is too nebulous for the exchanges under consideration in this Thesis.105

IV.

Unique Employment Relationships in the Gig and On-Demand
Economy
In the past half-decade an ongoing debate has transpired over increasing

flexibility in the American workplace. Some academics have considered flexible work
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arrangements, which can be defined as “a spectrum of work structures that alters the
time and/or place that work gets done on a regular basis.”106 A flexible work
arrangement can manifest as workers having more control over the amount of hours
they work, where they work, and how they schedule their work schedule. In 1985,
12.4% of the labor force worked on a flexible work schedule. By 2004, 27.5% of the
labor force worked on such a schedule.107 One potential reason the number grew so
dramatically is that new technologies and mass communication structures facilitate a
worker’s ability to engage in flexible work arrangements.
Since the 1980s, many employers have abandoned the goal of fostering a large
core of long-term employees. In some cases, long-term employees are laid off and then
rehired as temporary workers, a form of recall.108 In the eyes of many managers,
workers are more dispensable. Professor Paul Osterman notes that the capacity for
contingent workers to provide essential services to a given firm has increased
substantially. In his view, “temporary help firms take responsibility for an entire work
function, for example, call centers that handle customer relations.”109 The norms and
expectations that once dictated the behavior of American firms - the old psychological
contract - has undergone a transformation.
A long-term structural trend in the American economy is that workers are now
more easily deployed and terminated. The Gig and On-Demand economy operates in a
way that exacerbates this trend. When it comes to On-Demand services, workers can
be deployed at the literal push of a button. The universal order is further upturned by the
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fact that On-Demand platforms disrupt the fundamental dynamic between a manager
and their workers. In the On-Demand economy, workers are paid and monitored vis-avis the app-based platforms through which they find work. This dynamic is similar to
how temp workers are hired by temp agencies rather than the firms they are deployed
to. However, the instantaneous and pervasive nature of On-Demand platforms
magnifies the scale at which this phenomenon occurs: anybody in a city like New York
can recruit an On-Demand worker at any point in time. Thus, there are three parties at
play in labor relationships in the On-Demand economy: the individual offering a service,
the buyer seeking the service, and the platform that facilitates the entire exchange. OnDemand platforms present unique labor relationships that challenge longstanding
assumptions about the exchange of goods and services in the American economy.
One of the more impressive characteristics of the On-Demand economy is its
dependence on trust. Writing for the New York Times, Thomas Friedman argues that
platforms like Airbnb have “spawned [their] own ecosystem[s]… it used to be that
corporations and brands had all the trust.” Today, a total stranger “can be trusted like a
company and provide the services of a company.”110 Not only does the On-Demand
economy subvert traditional labor relationships but it also challenges conventional
consumption patterns. Millions of Americans are perfectly willing to meet up with or seek
the services of complete strangers because they trust app-based platforms and the
workers they deploy.
On-Demand firms also utilize tactics to further decouple themselves from the
workers they recruit. For example, Uber classifies itself as a technology rather than
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transportation company. As a result, workers are forced to drive their own personal
vehicles and the platform does not cover the cost of maintenance or repairs.111 In the
Gig and On-Demand economy, workers commodify their own goods and services rather
than utilizing firm-based capital; this is different than a traditional employer-employee
relationship where workers operate capital provided by an employer. Uber’s
classification as a technology company is a good example of a firm creatively trying to
cut costs. Hiring an employee, rather than an independent contractor, can be 20-30%
more expensive according to some sources.112 Currently, a major debate is transpiring
over Uber classifying its driver fleet as independent contractors instead of employees.
Critics argue that Uber exerts enough influence over its drivers for them to be
considered employees while the company claims that drivers have enough control over
their work schedules to not be considered employees. Of course, this is a vast
simplification of the debate, which will be discussed in greater detail at multiple points in
this Thesis.
According to NYU Stern Professor Arun Sundararajan, there are clear benefits
and costs to classifying Uber drivers - and On-Demand workers in general - as
employees. Drivers could potentially work more hours but they would also have less
autonomy when setting their work schedules.113 Some academics, like Harvard’s
Benjamin Sachs, express that the “causal arrow is backward” in the arguments posed
by pro-flexibility advocates. He argues that classifying a segment of workers as
employees doesn’t necessitate their employer exerting more control. “The bottom line,”
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says Sachs, “is that workers can choose when and how much to work, and can even
work without immediate supervision, and still be employees within the meaning of the
law.”114 Recall that Steve King countered this particular argument speaking from a
perspective that has worked firsthand with Uber drivers. What is abundantly clear is that
there is a lack of consensus when it comes to the employment classification of Uber
drivers. Uber’s app-based On-Demand employment schematic is new territory for
workers, academics, and business owners.
Some academics have taken umbrage with the fact that app-based platforms
don’t adhere to the same standards and regulations as traditional industries. Uber
drivers do not face the same hurdles that traditional taxi drivers do and folks renting out
space on Airbnb don’t have to uphold the same standards as traditional hotels or
motels. Some have gone as far to compare On-Demand services with “ticketscalpers.”115 Seeing as the On-Demand economy, as a phenomenon, is less than a
decade old, the federal government has yet to regulate it to the extent that traditional
services and exchanges are. Nonetheless, the forms of exchanges and services offered
via app-based platforms are distinct from traditional industries. Again, trust plays a
critical role. Consumers are willing to meet up with complete strangers. Any average
citizen with a car can become an Uber driver. This is not the case with taxi companies.
Any average citizen can deliver groceries through Taskrabbit. This is not the case when
ordering from a restaurant. At this point in time, the lack of institutional protections
surrounding the On-Demand economy is largely due to the fact that the government has
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yet to set it on the policy agenda. However, the On-Demand economy by nature
shouldn’t be regulated to the extent that traditional industries are. Consumers are driven
towards these services partially because they guarantee an ease of access and
convenience. A user’s whims can be satisfied at the push of a button. Later sections of
this Thesis will consider the idiosyncrasies of the On-Demand economy - and thus, why
On-Demand firms should not be held to the same standards as traditional ones - in
greater detail.
As the Gig and On-Demand economy poses an affront to the 20th century safety
net and the mechanisms through which workers are assured protections and public
services, many have called for a refurbished welfare state. Noah Lang of TechCrunch
insists that it is “time to unbundle benefits from employment classification and empower
[the] new economy to protect and train a flexible workforce.”116 Some experts have even
pointed towards the Gig and On-Demand economy as impetus for a new classification
of labor - a classification that lands somewhere between employee and independent
contractor. According to Bloomberg BNA, a “growing number of lawmakers, industry
leaders and worker advocates” have come to the conclusion that the “two-category
employment and tax classification systems simply might not” satisfy the needs of
workers in the Gig and On-Demand economy.117 Establishing a portable benefits
system may be a more realistic goal in the foreseeable future but there may come a
point where it would be more sustainable for Gig and On-Demand workers to be
assured a base-level of benefits and securities separate from those guaranteed to
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traditional employees. What’s most evident is that, as of yet, the employment
classification of On-Demand workers is up for debate. They operate on a spectrum that
doesn’t adhere to 20th century standards for workplace organization.
Recently a major paper written by Seth Harris of Cornell University and Alan
Krueger of Princeton University has proposed a new category of labor: The Independent
Worker. Their goal is to establish a clearly defined middle ground between employees
and independent contractors.118 The details of their policy proposal will be discussed at
a later point in this Thesis. Many experts and leaders in this sector of the economy have
called for the need to fortify a more sustainable environment for Gig and On-Demand
workers to navigate. In the previously referenced open letter, leaders in the Gig and OnDemand economy stressed the importance of establishing a “path forward that
encourages innovation, embraces new models, creates certainty for workers, business,
and government and ensures that workers and their families can lead sustainable lives
and realize their dreams.”119 The fundamental characteristics of the Gig and OnDemand economy undermine 20th century assumptions about American employment
relationships. The paradigm through which individuals navigate this new realm of work
must reflect how much employment relationships have evolved since the New Deal.

V.

Impact on Traditional Industries
The On-Demand economy has been received as a source of disruption by many

business owners, managers, and employees in traditional industries. It is important to
shed light on the ongoing dispute between new platforms and conventional firms. As
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has been established, the main discrepancy between ride-sharing platforms, like Uber
and Lyft, and conventional taxi companies has to do with regulation. One former Uber
driver argues that the platform is nothing more than “an app-based taxi service for nonprofessional, unregulated and underinsured drivers.”120 While this analysis is not
brought forth by a particularly impartial perspective it speaks to the source of Uber’s
profitability: its drivers play by looser rules than conventional taxi companies. Not to
mention, Uber is far more convenient for consumers. Some apps, like Flywheel, have
come to fruition in recent months with the goal of empowering traditional taxi drivers.
The app utilizes a cloud-based software system - TaxiOS - allowing the exchange
between a driver and passenger to be facilitated almost exclusively through a
smartphone. It allows passengers to order taxis on-demand and track their drivers via
GPS. Some see Flywheel as a “savior” for the taxi industry. Flywheel’s chief financial
officer, Oneal Bhambani, believes that the app will allow the taxi industry to “get through
this and grow.”121 What exactly is “this”? He’s referring to the ability for app-based ridesharing services to undermine the taxi industry by providing more convenience to
consumers as well as less barriers to entry for hopeful drivers.
Airbnb has also posed some major challenges for the hotel industry as well as
the rental rates in some urban areas. Much like Uber, as a service, Airbnb operates
more efficiently and with greater ease than traditional hotel and motel chains. Where
hotels and motels are expected to adhere to a set of legal standards, renters on Airbnb
hardly face any regulation at all. Most of the hurdles renters face on Airbnb are imposed
by the platform itself. Additionally, hotel managers face a greater tax incidence than
120
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individuals renting through Airbnb.122 The treasurer of San Francisco estimates that, as
of October 2015, Airbnb owed the city $25 million in back taxes.123 It makes sense that
Airbnb would be regulated to a lesser extent than hotels, as consumers are willing to
face increased risk for the sake of lower prices, but as the case with Uber, it is also
evident that the federal government has simply failed to regulate the platform in any
tangible manner. A few localities have made headway in imposing regulations on Airbnb
and they will be discussed in the Airbnb case study.
The On-Demand economy poses a threat to traditional industries by nature of
offering consumers convenience as well as lower prices. Many argue that one way to
address this situation is by imposing more regulations on firms thriving in the OnDemand economy. However, for these firms to retain the attributes that appeal to
consumers in the first place, they cannot be regulated in the same manner or to the
same extent that traditional industries are. The issue is that, as it stands, the lack of
regulation and consumer protections in the On-Demand economy is derived from
negligence rather than intent. To confront the root of the problem, policymakers must
formulate an outcome where platforms like Uber and Airbnb can complement, rather
than substitute, the taxi and hotel industries. In my view, there is room for both forms of
exchange.

VI.

The Role of Technology
Advancements in communications technology has always driven transformation

in the workplace. At the dawn of the 21st century, some academics identified the need
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for firms to develop strategic flexibility in the globalized playing field.124 Firms must
utilize the latest technology at their disposal for the sake of enhancing their capacity to
respond to market fluctuations and reorganize rapidly. Modern communication
structures shorten product life cycles and make patents less effective. Firms are
pressed to bring their goods or skills to market at a faster pace. Today, firms, according
to one source, “face significant uncertainty, ambiguity and an increasing number of
strategic discontinuities.” The American firm exists in a state of perpetual disequilibrium.
This forces managers and business owners to choose between “the stability necessary
to allow development of strategic planning and decision processes and instability that
allows continuous change and adaptation to a dynamic environment.”125 Workers are
expected to bear the brunt of growing instability and some argue that firms need to
introduce “horizontal structures” into the workplace by easing the barriers within a firm’s
organization.126 In other words, horizontal structures seek to de-specialize workers by
blurring the lines between different jobs. This also makes the average employee more
disposable.
The rapid rise of the On-Demand economy can largely be attributed to
technological advancements. A paper published by the Journal of the Association for
Information and Science Technology argues that growth in this sector of the economy is
“fueled by developments in information and communications technology… growing
consumer awareness, proliferation of collaborative web communities, as well as social
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commerce/sharing.”127 Whilst social dynamics have certainly played a role in driving
people towards the Gig and On-Demand economy, it is important to zero in on the role
technology plays in abetting new employment relationships. According to the
Freelancers Union’s 2015 survey, the internet and social media platforms have
“revolutionized” the process of finding and accessing work. What’s more, 32% of
freelancers have noted an increase in demand for their services from 2014 to 2015,
implying that an increasing number of Americans are turning to app-based platforms for
goods and services.128
Technology eases the barriers to entry for workers in the Gig and On-Demand
economy. 65% of workers surveyed indicate that the internet makes it easier for them to
find contingent work. 42% have found and completed freelance projects exclusively
online. 31% claim they can find a job assignment online in less than 24 hours.129 These
statistics validate the impulses driving workers towards the On-Demand economy in
search of full-time work: this sector offers an abundance of non-permanent work
arrangements. On-Demand platforms allow people to market their skills more widely
and with broader reach. Some organizations go as far to argue that the efficiency such
platforms allow in connecting managers and job-seekers could raise global GDP and
markedly lower unemployment.130 On-Demand platforms also promote transparency in
the labor market. Workers list their skills and credentials up-front-and-center.
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The technology on which On-Demand services rely not only provides benefits in
terms of increased efficiency, it can also enable the cultivation of a cohesive community.
The online platform Etsy - which does not technically provide On-Demand services, but
rather, connects users with other users who buy and sell homemade goods (therefore,
more akin to the Sharing economy) - is a good example of a marketplace that values
both “community and craftsmanship.”131 The platform tweaks its search engine to
accentuate sellers who receive the highest ratings from buyers. Etsy’s goal is to
optimize the user’s experience in a way that forms long-lasting connections between
buyers and sellers. Etsy CEO Chad Dickerson has gone on record saying that the
platform’s “superpower is connecting disaggregated networks of people in the Etsy
economy… when you build networks based on people, you’re building community.”132
Dickerson may be exaggerating the strength of Etsy’s communal bonds but his
company’s success does speak to the fact that On-Demand platforms aren’t simply
efficient, they can provide users with a community-oriented experience.
In most cases, unfortunately, advancements in technology create more pressure
than ease for American workers. One example is “just-in-time” scheduling employed by
many large-scale retailers. This form of scheduling relies on computerized
management; schedules are assigned based on “what times of day or the month [a
manager] expect[s] the most business, splitting up hours across a large workforce that’s
available on a moment’s notice and sometimes sending people home if traffic is
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slow.”133 Low-wage workers are held dominion to the needs of large corporations.
According to the Washington Post, 41% of “early-career, hourly workers get their
schedules less than a week in advance.”134 The problem has grown so pervasive that
some members of congress have penned legislation with the goal of providing workers
greater flexibility in determining their work schedule.135 Introducing automated
mechanisms to the workplace may help cut costs, but in many cases, it negatively
impacts the day-to-day lives of low-wage workers.
On-Demand platforms are far from exempt when it comes to utilizing new
technologies to the detriment of their workforces. Uber in particular has been placed
under much scrutiny for its practices. One academic paper claims that Uber employs a
form of “artificial management” that asserts a higher level of control and surveillance
over its fleet of drivers than a human manager would. The group of researchers who
penned the paper insist that the platform “exerts control over when and where drivers
work.”136 These and similar criticisms laid against Uber will be considered in greater
detail in Uber’s case study. At this point, it’s simply important to note that the same
technology that presents consumers with greater convenience may also cause
headaches for the workers providing services.
While currently not the case, there is potential for the same advancements in
technology that draw consumers to On-Demand platforms to provide workers with
greater utility. Steve King envisions a portable mechanism to provide benefits to
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workers in the Gig and On-Demand economy. In his hypothetical example, a platform
could reorient itself in a way that, with each exchange, a portion of the user’s fee, the
worker’s commission, and the platform’s cut can go towards some kind of universal fund
that will ensure an additional level of security for said worker. I have been highly
intrigued by this model, and the proposal itself will be discussed in a later section of this
Thesis. What’s critical to note is that On-Demand platforms could very easily be
updated to ensure a more effective benefits-provision system for workers. King notes
that leaders in the “industry will complain they can’t do it because technical difficulties,
but it’s not a challenge.”137
He recalls that a similar scenario played out a few years ago when the online
retailer Amazon claimed it was unfeasible to pay sales taxes. In reality, Amazon was
simply avoiding the incurrence of additional costs. In this case, state legislatures sought
to increase revenues by imposing a sales tax on online retailers. Despite Amazon’s
opposition, the issue was not one of feasibility. Online retailers like Amazon support “a
streamlined system simplifying the current hodgepodge of state and local levies.”138 The
Texas state government resolved the dispute with Amazon in a manner that indicates
the company was more concerned with incurring additional costs rather than facing
infrastructural hurdles. Officeholders in Texas cut a deal where Amazon created 2,500
new jobs and invested $200 million in a new distribution center in Texas if the state
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forgave $269 million in back sales taxes. Amazon agreed to maintain the jobs and
investments for at least five years.139
On-Demand platforms also offer a potential avenue for massive political action.
In San Francisco, Airbnb mobilized its users into a political operation not dissimilar to
that of a labor union. In 2015, the Proposition F ballot initiative threatened Airbnb’s
market supremacy in San Francisco. The dispute will be discussed in full detail in the
Airbnb case study. The On-Demand platform took charge in fighting the ballot initiative
by organizing “voting blocs in other cities where it operates... the company… [hopes to
create] 100 ‘clubs’ made up of Airbnb home-sharers.” Platforms like Airbnb gain market
dominance through a “kind of guerrilla growth strategy” where they recruit a “modest
team of workers in a city and immediately start providing their services to the public.”140
The especially strategic firms, like Airbnb, employ the technology at their disposal to
fend off regulation with populist fervor and a loyal user base. What if these same tactics
were used to advocate for On-Demand workers themselves?
One of the most promising attributes of the On-Demand economy is how the
technology can be appropriated to advocate for workers. On-Demand platforms also
have the capacity to revitalize struggling industries by transforming their business
models. In Brooklyn, one seltzer company has turned to the On-Demand economy as a
means to reimagine their antiquated door-to-door seltzer business by offering it through
a fresh method of transmission. According to owner Alex Gomberg, “we still use the
bottles from the 1940s and 50s, we still use wooden crates, and we hand deliver them.”
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What’s the twist? The seltzer can now be ordered through email or Facebook. While this
may not be as convenient or contemporary as employing an app-based platform,
Gomberg’s success indicates that consumers prioritize convenience and creativity.
Today, barbers, doctors, and tailors can all be summoned to some one’s home via appbased platforms.141 A new niche is being carved out for old-school services. The same
technology that spells convenience for consumers could potentially work to fortify
security for struggling businesses and precarious workers alike.
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Chapter 2: The Dangers of the New Employment Landscape
I.

Case Studies: On-Demand Platforms
A. Uber
Founded in 2009, Uber describes itself as a platform responsible for “changing

the logistical fabric of cities around the world.”142 A product of the age of convenience,
Uber allows users to call drivers at the literal push of a button. The platform was first
introduced as nothing more than a map on a smartphone. While the technical
infrastructure underpinning the app is highly sophisticated, its ultimate purpose is using
GPS to connect drivers and users.143 Uber considers itself a source of local economic
growth, reliability, and convenience.144 As of 2015, the company has amassed a market
value of $51 billion, an amount greater than Delta, United Airlines, and even General
Motors.145 The variety of services offered by Uber has gradually expanded alongside its
popularity. UberX, the cheapest service, connects users with drivers who drive relatively
low-cost sedans. UberXL, the service intended for large groups of people, connects
users with drivers using SUVs or mini-vans. Finally, UberSelect promises users a luxury
sedan while UberBLACK, the platform’s most secure and expensive iteration, offers
“commercially registered and insured livery vehicles.”146 Recently, the company
introduced UberEATS, which allows drivers to “pick up food from a distribution center,
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store it in their car, and deliver it” to users.147 By offering a variety of services through a
single medium the company has signaled its desire to consolidate the entire app-based
ride-sharing market. Uber is a paragon of versatility in the On-Demand economy.
The company doesn’t own any of the cars used by its drivers or directly employ
the drivers themselves; instead, they file as 1099 contractors. CEO Travis Kalanick
insists that Uber is part of the “technology industry” rather than the transportation
industry.148 This is why the platform is able to circumvent the regulations levied upon
traditional taxi companies. According to Steven Hill, Uber, and peer ride-sharing
platforms, play the role of “matchmaker.”149 They connect customers and drivers and
then take a cut of the fare as a sort of finder’s fee. According to Hill, Uber’s cut has risen
from 5% of every fare to 20-25%.150 Not only is Uber far more convenient than a
conventional taxicab, it’s cheaper in most American cities.151 Uber does perform
background checks on would-be drivers, but the rigor of this process has been called
into question.152 Aside from submitting to background checks, aspiring drivers must also
be at least 21 years of age and operate a vehicle that was manufactured in 2000 or later
(2005, in some cases).153 Satisfying these three requirements is relatively painless
compared to the requirements set by competing industries. Traditional taxi drivers are
compelled to pay application fees and bus drivers must undergo a “three week training
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program.”154 At Uber, once an individual passes the requisite background check, and
confirms their age and condition of their vehicle, they are free to work.
A report released in January 2015 claims that, in the United States, Uber deploys
over 163,000 drivers as of 2014 but that 80% of those drivers work part-time. Over half
of them drove fewer than 15 hours per week. However, the Wall Street Journal reports
that, as of December 2015, “Uber... boasts 400,000 drivers, up from none four years
ago.”155 Based on Uber’s internal data, the average wage for drivers is $17 an hour in
Los Angeles, $23 an hour in San Francisco, and $30 an hour in New York.156 It is worth
noting that Uber drivers have to cover the cost of everyday expenses like gas, car
maintenance, tolls, vehicle depreciation, insurance, car washing, traffic tickets, and
whatever other costs they may incur on the job. One Uber-distinct feature, “surge
pricing,” is “driven by a complicated computer algorithm based on the supply of both
customers and drivers at any particular time.”157 The platform is readily equipped to
instantaneously respond to market mechanisms. If passenger demand is high, like it is
on a federal holiday, then fares can become “wildly unpredictable, escalating to 10
times the normal rate.”158 Some journalists, like Hill, have called the ethics of this
mechanism into question, fearing that it could be used to take advantage of a local crisis
or natural disaster.
Over the past few years, Uber has established itself as an international
powerhouse. At its launch in 2010, service was limited to San Francisco. The platform
first went international in 2011 by expanding operations to Paris. By 2014, Uber was
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available in 240 cities in 46 countries.159 The company’s attempts to enter foreign
markets have, in some instances, been met with resistance. Governments in Australia,
Belgium, Germany, and the Philippines, for example, “have instituted short-lived bans
on the service or levied stiff fines on its drivers” out of fear that the platform “drains
money from” domestic transportation markets.160 Regardless, such incidents have not
stunted the firm’s overall growth: On Christmas Eve 2015, the five-year-old firm
completed its one billionth ride.161 I previously noted that Uber has recruited somewhere
between 160,000 and 500,000 part- or full-time drivers in the United States. Some
sources contend that, globally, over 1 million drivers are active on the platform.162 Uber
has opened up a Pandora’s box: while, on the surface, it may operate as a simple ridesharing platform, it has introduced the On-Demand model to millions of consumers and
workers around the world.
In the previous chapter, I discussed the extent of influence artificial management
exerts over a given workforce. One academic paper published by the Data and Society
Research Institute and NYU posits that, despite Kalanick’s claims, Uber’s software is
not passive; it exerts control over a driver’s workday the way a human manager would.
In fact, the researchers found that “the level of control and surveillance [the platform]
exert[s] is often far greater” than human management.163 Driver evaluations are
facilitated by an automated ratings system: through the app, riders evaluate a given
driver on a one-to-five star scale. The software then tallies the driver’s overall scores to
159
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provide an occasional evaluation and compares those scores with other drivers. Thus,
customers act as middle managers, and drivers can evaluate passengers as well.
Furthermore, the software doesn’t dictate when drivers work but it does “prod” them the service alerts drivers when surge pricing is “due to kick in.”164 Uber drivers are also
compelled to accept ride requests without knowing the passenger’s destination and are
unable “to determine if that fare would be financially worthwhile.”165 Furthermore, drivers
are encouraged to provide riders with bottled water, phone chargers, and other services
at their own expense.166
Kalanick upholds that Uber, and On-Demand platforms in general, are a source
of empowerment for American workers. “Go to anybody who is an employee
somewhere and ask them if they’d like to set their hours versus having shifts [scheduled
for them],” says Kalanick.167 In exchange for increased autonomy, Uber drivers forego
the protections and benefits granted to traditional l employees. The risks Gig workers
face has already been discussed in great detail and Uber drivers are not exempt from
those dangers. The AFL-CIO recently published a “set of principles” for workers in the
On-Demand economy arguing that the government needs to “broaden access to
portable benefits delivered by governmental mechanisms.”168 Labor advocates, like the
AFL-CIO, argue that, even though workers juggling multiple jobs willingly face increased
risk, they should be ensured greater stability than currently is the case. Over the past
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several months Uber has been criticized for classifying its driver fleet as independent
contractors rather than employees.
In 2015, California established itself as ground zero for the employeeindependent contractor debate. Critics say that Uber disguises employees as
independent contractors: the service sets prices, evaluates a driver’s performance, and
dismisses workers at will. Uber proponents claim that the platform simply connects
customers with drivers; it doesn’t dictate where drivers work, whether or not they have
to accept a passenger, or a driver’s work schedule. Despite Uber’s insistence on the
contrary, a California labor commissioner ruled that a driver who filed a claim against
the company was, in fact, an employee. This particular ruling applied only to that
individual driver.169 Much to the firm’s chagrin, a San Franciscan federal judge recently
granted that same suit class-action status, meaning that Californian Uber drivers who
joined the service before June 2014 can sue the company over their employment status
as a single party. The class-action certification only applies to employee status and tips,
not for general expenses.170 The suit may be exclusive to California but the company
fears that the forthcoming ruling could set a precedent for the entire nation. In an
interview with NPR, Uber board member, David Plouffe, insists that employee status
would hurt, rather than help, Uber drivers. “They like the classification… they can sign
up to [drive] when they’re home from school, can sign up when they’ve lost some hours
at their main job… they can stop doing it whenever, voluntarily,” says Plouffe. He points
to the fact that the service’s “busiest time is bar closing time” between 11:30 to 3:00
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AM.171 If drivers were classified as employees they would lose the flexibility that allows
them to drive on their own schedule. Plouffe refused to speculate about Uber’s next
move if the Californian case doesn’t swing in the firm’s favor. According to Fortune
magazine, the reclassification of Uber’s driver fleet in California - nearly 160,000 drivers
- could cost the company over $4 billion dollars.172173 64% of that cost would be derived
from driver reimbursement for “miles, gas and tolls,” 15% would be derived from “payroll
taxes” for Social Security and Medicare, and 12% would be derived from workers’
compensation.174
In other states, Uber has found some success in maintaining its market
supremacy. State legislatures in Ohio and Florida are “moving ahead” with regulations
that would codify the independent contractor status of Uber drivers.175 Similar legislation
has already passed in North Carolina, Arkansas, and Indiana. Not only has Uber
publicly expressed support for such initiatives but the company has actually deployed
representatives to help “negotiate language” in the Ohio bill.176 It is somewhat
uncommon, notes one expert, for public policy, instead of the judicial system, “to weigh
in on the labor practices of companies.”177 This may indicate that disputes surrounding
regulation in the On-Demand economy will play out in federal and state legislatures
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rather than the judicial system. Some states have begun categorizing ride-sharing
platforms like Uber and Lyft as Transportation Network Companies (TNCs).
As Uber’s classification battle has gained traction in the media, some experts
have come out of the woodwork advocating for Uber drivers to be granted employeestatus. One attorney, who has represented workers in the Gig economy, claims “Uber
drivers cannot be classified as independent contractors because the company
evaluates driver performance, claiming the right to deactivate drivers who receive poor
customer ratings.” She also postulates that Uber could “give Uber drivers employee
status and increase [its own] share of profits—now set at 20 percent—to pay for the
provision of labor benefits.”178 Harvard professor Benjamin Sachs flat-out rejects the
notion that granting drivers employee status will inhibit the flexibility of their work:
“If a court determines that… [Uber] drivers [are] ‘employees...’ [the firm] would
not somehow then be required to exercise additional control over when and how long
the drivers worked, or over other aspects of the job that are currently flexible. Uber
would be required to comply with minimum wage laws, safety and health laws, and antidiscrimination laws, and it would be required to contribute to unemployment insurance
and withhold payroll taxes and the like. But it could do all of this without taking away the
flexibility that the drivers currently enjoy.”179
According to experts like Sachs, the debate isn’t really about impacting the
flexibility of Uber’s business model. It’s about imposing additional costs on the firm and
providing drivers with more benefits.
In 2015, the Oregon Bureau of Labor and Industries published an advisory
opinion asserting that Uber drivers should be classified as employees. The agency
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came to this conclusion by applying “a six factor ‘economic realities’ test.”180 The
advisory opinion found that, among other conclusions, Uber exerts a significant degree
of control over its workers: drivers do not have the ability to exercise “managerial
functions,” Uber sets fare rates without input from drivers, and drivers act as an
“integral” part of the firm’s business model.181 Under Oregon law, says the state’s
Bureau of Labor and Industries, Uber drivers are employees.
In light of polarized debate surrounding employment classification in the OnDemand economy some experts argue there may be a third option. “The fundamental
nature of work is changing and I don't believe in the future that it's just going to be a
binary choice between a 1099 worker or a W-2 worker,” says Senator Mark Warner.182
A new classification could allow for increased flexibility while ensuring a base-line of
security. Enter Seth Harris of Cornell University and Alan Krueger of Princeton
University. In a recent paper, the two professors envision a new category of labor: The
Independent Worker. Formulated with full-time Gig workers in mind, the category hopes
to address the fact that “many workers in the so-called online gig economy should have
more rights and protections than most do now… [but that] ‘forcing these new forms of
work into a traditional employment relationship could be an existential threat to the
emergence of online-intermediated work.’”183184 The viability of the Independent Worker
proposal will be explored in greater detail at a later point in this Thesis. What’s important
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to consider, in the case of Uber especially, is that the labor classification issue is
currently stoking discord in the On-Demand economy. Policy proposals hoping to
alleviate such disputes have just come to fruition and it is likely that other proposals will
be discussed in the near future. Time is ticking and some local jurisdictions have
already taken action.
In December 2015, Seattle’s city council unanimously voted in support of a
resolution that allows Uber, Lyft, and other ride-sharing workers to unionize. The
ordinance is the first of its kind in the country. The fledgling App-Based Drivers
Association worked with the local Teamsters union to advocate for the legislation.185
Despite the symbolic significance of the ordinance, it poses logistical problems as it
technically contradicts federal law. David Plouffe has described the proposal as “flatly
illegal.”186 The bill seeks to circumvent the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, which
doesn’t apply to independent contractors, by relying on one loophole: the NLRA “doesn’t
bar state and local governments from enacting their own legislation that would allow
independent contractors to organize.”187 This debate is ongoing and the outcome has
yet to be seen.
In February 2016, Uber drivers in New York City, particularly those driving to and
from LaGuardia airport, went on strike. Writing for Fortune, Kia Kokalitcheva claims that
drivers were protesting fare cuts levied on them during a holiday season demand slump.
An Uber spokesman claims that, since the cut, “drivers have spent spent 39% less time
between trips which has increased average hourly earnings by 20% compared to two
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weekends” prior.188 Despite such claims, labor leaders seized the opportunity to bring
Uber drivers into the fold. As of February 3, 2016, The International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, Local 1430, filed a petition with the National Labor Relations Board
in the hopes of representing “600 Uber drivers who make pickups at LaGuardia
Airport.”189 It has yet to be seen whether or not these drivers will join the IBEW.
As is the case with the class-action suit in California, the dispute transpiring in
New York City continues to rage on. The fate of Uber drivers has yet to be decided.
What is clear is that ride-sharing platforms like Uber present American workers with a
new type of labor relationship. Conventional political and legal solutions have yet to
quell fury on both sides of the debate.

B. Airbnb
Founded in San Francisco during the summer of 2008, Airbnb describes itself as
a “trusted community marketplace for people to list, discover, and book unique
accommodations around the world.”190 Users can book a room via the company’s
website or its app-based platform. According to the company’s own data, Airbnb has
connected over 60,000,000 guests with hosts, operates in over 34,000 cities and over
190 countries, and boasts over 2,000,000 listings worldwide.191 Surveying Airbnb is a
different task than surveying Uber; where the primary concern with Uber is the
experiences of its drivers and the labor relationships the platform bears, my interest in
Airbnb is derived, not from the treatment of renters, but from the repercussions of the
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platform’s unregulated nature. How does Airbnb affect local economies? What kind of
safeguards does the platform provide its users?
Steven Hill believes that Airbnb embodies the Gig and On-Demand better than
most platforms. Airbnb hosts provide “a niche for travelers looking for low-cost
accommodations, particularly during high-season times when hotel vacancies are
scarce.”192 As of October 2015, the company is valued at $25 billion, the same as the
Hyatt chain of hotels, and the firm employs a thousand people around the world.193
According to LinkedIn, Airbnb employs Public Policy Managers, Data Analysts,
Community Organizers, Software Engineers, and other positions that entail full-time
roles.194 Hill claims that the platform also acts as “a catalyst for massive law-breaking, a
tax rogue and, tragically, an impetus for the eviction of longtime tenants.”195
There have been reports - in San Francisco, for example - of landlords evicting
tenants for the sake of renting through Airbnb and other short-term rental platforms.
According to San Francisco’s Rent Board, 2,000 units were evicted in 2013, 13% more
than was the case in 2012.196 The San Francisco Chronicle found that two-thirds of the
private or shared rooms available through Airbnb “are entire houses or apartments with
no owner present during the rental period.” Nearly a third of San Franciscan rentals “are
controlled by people with two or more listings.”197 Statistics such as these indicate that
landlords in San Francisco have been appropriating the platform as a more convenient
form of long-term renting as opposed to offering short-term hospitality. This
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phenomenon is not exclusive to San Francisco: an investigation conducted the Attorney
General of New York found that “almost half of Airbnb’s $1.45 million in revenue [in New
York state] came from hosts who had at least three listings on the site.”198 The multiple
listings imply that these renters use the platform professionally. The report also found
that nearly 2,000 units brokered through Airbnb were rented for more than half a year in
2013, “taking them effectively off the market for local residents.” Almost three-quarters
of the Airbnb rentals listed in New York City during 2013 were illegal due to zoning and
municipal regulations. Attorney General Schneiderman concludes that, in New York, the
platform has raked in ~$40 million thanks to “illegal” listings.199
In terms of safety precautions, Hill insists that Airbnb underperforms, as it only
offers free smoke and carbon monoxide detectors to hosts.200 At this point, it has
become abundantly clear that part of what characterizes the On-Demand economy is a
lack of regulation. Airbnb in particular has received a lot of criticism from journalists and
even users for its laizze faire attitude towards ensuring its users safety. Hosts verify
their IDs by “connecting to their social networks and scanning their official ID or
confirming personal details;” however, Hill discovered that he could sign up as a host
without undergoing a background check, ID verification, or any kind of confirmation of
his personal details.201 Proponents praise Airbnb’s ability to generate demand by
commodifying unused space in a given home or apartment and CEO Brian Chesky
insists that allowing renters to make some additional income is the intended purpose of
the platform. “In the last 12 months in Paris, we’ve generated $240 million in economic
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activity,” Chesky said in July 2013.202 In writing for the New York Times, Thomas
Friedman notes that, on Airbnb, “no one is anonymous” because guests and hosts are
able to verify the other’s identity via driver’s license or passport.203 In terms of quality
assurance, Airbnb operates in a way similar to Uber: guests and hosts can rate each
other online. This acts as the only incentive for renters to deliver a pleasant experience.
Additionally, the platform “automatically provides $1 million in insurance against
damage or theft” to as many hosts as possible, depending on their country’s laws.204
Airbnb allows for increased efficiency insofar that it allows individuals to make
use of their under-utilized inventory. Some academics argue that the rapid rise of homesharing platforms like Airbnb is partially due to their ability to “scale supply in a near
frictionless manner” as well as provide a variety of living options.205 In terms of
impacting the pre-existing hospitality industry, a 2013 study on Airbnb’s market impact
in Austin, Texas found that the platform’s market entry coincided with a “statistically
significant decrease in occupancy rate [for traditional hotels] and an even bigger
decrease in hotel room prices.” The same study found that Airbnb works to the
detriment of independent hotels more-so than chain hotels.206 Specifically, a 10%
increase in Airbnb listings is correlated with a “statistically significant 0.34% decrease in
monthly hotel room revenue.”207 The authors of the study conclude that Airbnb is
altering consumption patterns to the detriment of non-chain hotels and motels. It seems
to be the case that Airbnb acts as a complement to chain hotels and a substitute to
independent ones. In terms of local governance, Airbnb is exempt from paying
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municipal taxes, which hurts a locality's short-term revenue. It is possible that platforms
like Airbnb attract increased consumption in a given city or town in the long-run, which
could act as a boon to local businesses.
In 2015, Zak Stone’s father died while using a rope swing in a house his family
rented through Airbnb. The tree the swing was attached to broke in half and crushed his
father’s head. The story sparked a major debate surrounding the platform’s liability
issues. Months prior to this incident, Airbnb began offering “free, automatic secondary
coverage for liability” but then made the coverage primary following Mr. Stone’s death. It
covers up to $1 million per incident.208 The firm set a $10 million annual limit on this
policy, which has raised some questions about the platform’s ability to cover each and
every Airbnb user in the case of crisis. Writing for the New York Times, Ron Lieber
echoes a point that’s been made before: “without good data, we’re all flailing about
looking for anecdotes.”209 Hosts renting through platforms like Airbnb and HomeAway
need not abide by the plethora of safety regulations levied on traditional hotels and
motels. Pundits have grown weary of the regulation gap between On-Demand
hospitality platforms and the traditional hospitality industry.
During the 2015 elections, Airbnb faced other obstacles in the form of increased
regulation vis-a-vis ballot initiatives. In San Francisco, Proposition F threatened to “curb
the number of days a host can rent on the… platform - capping both hosted and
unhosted rentals at 75 days per year.”210 If passed, the initiative would have confronted
the long-term rental issue impacting local economies head-on. Lucky for Airbnb, the
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initiative was defeated with 55% of the San Franciscan electorate voting no.211 In the
weeks and months leading up the election, the proposal became a major point of
debate. First, supporters of Proposition F formed an unlikely coalition comprised of
“affordable housing and tenants rights activists, property owners, and politicians whose
decades-long careers and lives have intersected with some of the city’s most landmark
planning decisions.”212 The bulk of donations in support of the would-be ordinance came
from the hotel workers union. The pro-Proposition F coalition raised roughly $390,000.
In response, Airbnb opened its war chest and funneled $8 million into defeating the
ballot initiative. The company hired experienced local political operatives and even
deployed a formidable ad campaign and organized “extensive precinct walks.”213
Whatever the resources going into supporting or defeating the initiative, Proposition F
was defeated by an impressive margin, implying that San Franciscans truly didn’t want
to introduce the types of regulations outlined by the proposal.
While Proposition F’s ultimate goal was to restrict long-term rentals through
home-sharing platforms, one source argues that it presented a “flexible kind of
regulation that is badly suited for a dynamic and fast-changing market.” The proposal
“also leans on the threat of neighbor-to-neighbor litigation in which residents are entitled
to civil penalties, which could chill the entire market.”214 Pitting neighbors against one
another, under the threat of civil penalties, is bound to breed discord. It is true that,
currently, Airbnb acts as an easily scalable free market platform but, as the electoral
outcome implies, voters don’t want to impose rigid regulations that would impact the
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viability of platforms like Airbnb altogether. Still, the San Franciscan Office of Economic
Analysis insists that new regulations must be imposed on Airbnb. According to the
agency’s “REMI model,” removing a “single [rental] unit from the market [has] a total
economic impact on the city's economy of approximately -$250,000 to -$300,000 per
year.”215 If this is truly the public cost of long-term renting through app-based homesharing platforms, then Airbnb works to the detriment of local economies.”216
Proposition F may have failed, but the costs Airbnb imposes on San Francisco’s
local economy continues to draw ire from officeholders. Furthermore, a different ballot
initiative concerned with Airbnb’s influence on San Franciscan policy making,
Proposition C, won the support of nearly 75% of the electorate.217 The measure poses
increased regulation on “expenditure lobbyists, any person or group, including
nonprofits, labor unions and for-profit companies” that spend more than $2,500 in one
month to “urge city officials” by forcing them to “register with the Ethics Commission and
disclose their activity.”218 Proposition C gained bipartisan support in city hall and the
Ethics Commissions cites Airbnb as an example of an organization “exerting influence”
on city policymaking by “funding outside groups to contact city officials or turn up to
testify at public meetings.”219 While Airbnb’s activity may have served as impetus for the
ballot initiative it is not clear that the support it gained on Election Day was a
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referendum on Airbnb and its presence in San Francisco, seeing as the proposal did not
mention Airbnb by name. A similar argument could be made for Proposition F’s failure.
Airbnb utilized some groundbreaking tactics in organizing a political base against
Proposition F. Most of the nearly $8 million dollars raised by groups opposed to
Proposition F was allocated towards “mobilizing Airbnb hosts and users.”220 Chris
Lehane, a Washington political operative acting as Airbnb’s head of global policy and
public affairs, also worked to frame Proposition F as a “hotel-industry-led attack on the
middle class” in order to foment greater public support. Under Lehane’s leadership, the
platform is preparing for future battles by “working to organize voting blocs in other
cities… sort of like local unions.”221 Some pundits have referred to Airbnb and its peers’
tactics, whereby multi-billion-dollar companies direct their war chests toward galvanizing
grassroots support, as a “guerilla growth strategy.”222 When mayor Bill de Blasio voiced
support for regulating Uber, the company responded by “tweaking its smartphone app
with a special ‘de Blasio’ feature to show users in New York how hard it would be to get
an Uber ride” with would-be regulations in place.223 Old-school organizing tactics, once
employed by labor unions, take on a new flavor and operate on an unprecedented scale
in the On-Demand economy thanks to technological innovations.
For all of Airbnb’s past refusals to comply with demands for increased
transparency, a shift may be transpiring within the firm. In December 2015, Airbnb
released a trove of internal data. The data shows that, from November 2014 to
November 2015, “some 75 percent of revenue earned by active hosts in New York City
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who share their entire home came from people who have only one or two rental listings
on the platform.”224 The firm estimates that this percentage will rise to 93% by 2016. Mr.
Lehane says that “the vast majority of the community is doing this in the right way.”225
Airbnb continues to insist that the majority of its users turn to the platform as a “lifeline”
to make ends meet. Still, the data provided does little to quell growing concerns about
Airbnb’s liability risks as well as the company’s impact on local economies. Airbnb’s
stated goal in sharing its internal data is to work with regulators to “draft more
comprehensive, up-to-date legislation that deals with the short-term-rental
phenomenon.”226 Whatever the validity of this claim, conventional approaches towards
policymaking are not the most effective in confronting the risks posed by the OnDemand economy.

C. TaskRabbit and other On-Demand Labor-Brokering Services
Launched in 2008, TaskRabbit is an On-Demand platform that connects
companies and users with “Taskers” who complete small jobs on a gig-to-gig basis. The
firm claims that it allows users to “outsource [their] household errands and skilled tasks
to trusted people in [their] community,” framing the platform as a means to strengthen
neighbor-to-neighbor relations in modern American society.227 While TaskRabbit hasn’t
proven as profitable as Uber or Airbnb, CEO Leah Busque contends that the platform
quadrupled its revenue in 2015 and “is in line to become profitable in 2016.”228 This
trend implies that demand for the service is growing. Through TaskRabbit, users can
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recruit a Tasker to buy their groceries, edit a paper, or construct a furniture set from
Ikea. TaskRabbit and other On-Demand labor-brokering platforms, like Upwork or
Freelancer.com, epitomize the essence of the Gig and On-Demand economy where
workers are recruited by multiple temporary job-providers on a task-by-task basis.
Where Uber and Airbnb provide a very particular service to consumers, generalized
labor-brokering platforms, like TaskRabbit, allow for a greater level of versatility. Steven
Hill reports that TaskRabbit takes a 10-20% cut from a worker’s commission per task,
although Wired claims the platform takes a cut anywhere between 12-30%; higher
percentages are deducted from “lower-value jobs.”229230 The commission for each
completed task is deposited into the Tasker’s TaskRabbit account and they receive a
payout every Friday. It’s also worth noting that Taskers are only compensated for the
tasks they complete rather than being paid by the hour. Taskers cover the cost of
commuting to and from tasks out of their own pocket and they are not reimbursed for
users who, at the last minute, decide they no longer require the Tasker’s services.
TaskRabbit also utilizes “gamification techniques” where Taskers are rewarded
for each task they complete. They are also ranked on a “leaderboard” that lists the toprated Taskers; higher-rated Taskers are able to charge higher rates.231232 Taskers are
vetted through a “three-step process” that begins with them filling out an application and
leads to an “automated phone or video interview that poses a series of questions
designed to weed out deadbeats.” 233 The process is punctuated by the platform
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performing a federal criminal background check on the aspiring Tasker. 70% of Taskers
hold at least a bachelor’s degree, 20% hold a master’s degree, and 5% hold a PhD.234
TaskRabbit is accessible to those looking for full-time work, those searching for an
additional stream of revenue, or for unemployed individuals searching for a stopgap
between jobs.
Some have likened labor-brokering platforms to a form of labor auctioning: any
individual or firm can temporarily deploy a worker by choosing one from of a collection
of profiles. Upwork operates on a slightly different model than TaskRabbit. Where
TaskRabbit is a more generalized platform, Upwork’s intended purpose is to match
users and firms with “freelancing creatives” who develop websites, software and apps,
design logos, write articles, act as translators, provide customer or technical services,
and more.235 Steven Hill voices concern that putting workers in direct competition with
other workers around the globe has acted to significantly reduce hourly income.236
Upwork and Elance are two of the biggest firms in the online labor-brokerage market.
According to the company’s internal data, in February 2013, Elance “was being used by
approximately 500,000 businesses and 2 million registered freelance professionals” and
Upwork “was even bigger, with 2.7 million freelancers and 540,000 clients
worldwide.”237 The two companies merged in December 2013 under the moniker
Upwork. As of 2015, Upwork hosts 9 million registered freelancers, 4 million registered
clients, and $1 billion worth of work is performed through the platform on an annual
basis. The company asserts that its mission is to “create economic and social value on
234

Newton, Casey. "Temping Fate: Can TaskRabbit Go from Side Gigs to Real Jobs?" The Verge. Vox
Media, 23 May 2013. Web.
235
Hill. Raw Deal. 102.
236
Hill. Raw Deal. 102.
237
Hill. Raw Deal. 103.

79

a global scale by providing a trusted online workplace to connect, collaborate, and
succeed.”238
On TaskRabbit in particular, Taskers are able to set their own prices for the
services they provide. One Tasker described this price-setting environment as a “race to
the bottom.”239 What’s more, Taskers sign a contract with TaskRabbit that allows the
firm to “terminate or suspend [one’s] right to use the Service at any time for any or no
reason.”240 One component of the On-Demand labor-brokerage model is that workers
don’t get paid for on-the-job downtime, like time spent at a water cooler or bathroom
breaks. They only get paid for the specific tasks they complete. One could argue this a
fairer method of compensation but it is yet another example of the subversion of
conventional employer-employee relationships. The fundamental issue posed by OnDemand labor-brokering platforms is that risk, instead of being imposed on the firm, is
now imposed on its workers. This falls in line with macrostructural trends in the
American labor market since the 1970s.
TaskRabbit, Upwork, and platforms of the like also embody a recurring theme in
the On-Demand economy: while the methods these firms employ in matching jobproviders and workers is highly efficient, they bypass the traditional channels through
which workers receive benefits and protections. In the words of the former chair of the
President's Council of Economic advisers, Laura Tyson, America’s “‘social contract’ has
long relied on employers to deliver unemployment insurance, disability insurance,
pensions and retirement plans, worker’s compensation… paid time off and protections
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under the Fair Labor Standards act.”241 Tyson warns of the emergence of a two-tier
workforce in the American economy. One-tier is “populated by fully employed high-skill
workers with generous employer-provided (and tax-advantaged) benefits” along with
high-skill individuals who are able to self-finance benefits thanks to the generous
incomes they earn as independent contractors or self-employed workers; the secondtier is comprised of “a large pool of contingent middle- and low-skill workers without the
benefits, income, or security on which a robust and resilient middle-class depends.”242
Recently, the National Domestic Workers Association published a “Good Work
Code” that offers an eight-pillar rubric for improving working conditions in the Gig and
On-Demand economy: “safety, stability and flexibility, transparency, shared prosperity, a
livable wage, inclusion and input, support and connection, and growth and
development.”243 In the minds of some academics and American labor advocates,
there’s no reason for On-Demand workers to be excluded from employment
discrimination laws or from the right to unionize or collectively bargain. It is also unclear
why platforms like Uber, TaskRabbit, and Upwork are exempt from paying Social
Security or Medicare taxes - or making payments into an analogous benefits-provision
system. Professors Seth Harris and Alan Krueger do, however, see the value in
excluding Gig and On-Demand workers from the minimum wage and overtime laws due
to the fact that they engage in unpredictable and alternative work schedules. These
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workers hold more autonomy in choosing the hours they work and can terminate their
arrangement with a given On-Demand firm at will.244
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Chapter 3: Historical Precedents
I.

History of Workplace Provided Benefits, Voice, and Countervailing
Power
One of the key features of the postwar labor market was the mutual commitment

a firm shared with its workforce. This was the case for many unionized and
nonunionized businesses and bred what Paul Osterman calls the “organization man.”245
The organization man lived his life within, unsurprisingly, one organization. In this
environment, both managers and other white-collar workers faced little risk of layoff and
blue-collar workers were assured some semblance of security. Many blue-collar layoffs
were followed by recall. Because most firms faced formidable competition, the labor
market was less competitive for job-seekers; firms were compelled to offer steady
wages in order to attract potential employees. This era of employment emphasized
continuity and fairness. Wage setting and overall business practices were stickier, less
subject to change than they are today.
What has yet to be investigated in this Thesis is the role union-management
agreements played in establishing industry-wide norms that worked to benefit the
average worker. “At their peak,” in 1945, “unions represented 35.5% of the private
sector labor force.”246 Unions held wide influence in setting labor conditions for
nonunion firms due to the previously discussed threat effect and set industry-wide
standards for firm organization in a given industry. Osterman recounts that, “the
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unionized system of seniority, job classifications, and temporary layoffs followed by
recall was widely influential even in the nonunion manufacturing sector.”247
Internal labor markets make it so both firms and workers are obligated to an
implicit contract of mutual long-term commitment. Theoretically speaking, they ensure
“that the pricing and allocation of labor is governed by a set of administrative rules and
procedures.”248 In the postwar Industrial model, internal labor markets served to arrange
jobs based on seniority or some trend of internal progression where entry-level jobs lie
at the bottom of the totem pole and came with the prospect of mobility. In many cases,
existing employees were recruited to fill vacancies in senior-level positions. Stone posits
that Internal Labor Markets exist for three reasons: to provide informal on-the-job
training that increases the value of a given labor force, reduce employee turnover, and
“yield savings in recruitment, screening, and training costs.”249 During the postwar era,
from a structural perspective, firms were more willing to forego future earnings for the
sake of maintaining a stable and dependable workforce. When employees were first
hired, the firm initially worked at a loss due to the cost of training. Eventually, workers
would grow more productive and the marginal value of the items they produced would
outpace the cost of hourly compensation. Later, when a worker neared retirement, the
firm’s return on this investment would diminish but the worker’s income would not be
reduced. At this point, the employee was to able recoup the initial cost - an entry-level
wage - their employer imposed on them.250 As has been well established, today’s
industry-wide norms have shifted. Workers are much more disposable, the demand for
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highly skilled industrial labor has diminished, and firms can more easily outsource or
automate aspects of existing jobs. This is why some theorists have likened the
contemporary American labor market to a race-to-the-bottom.
Katherine Stone argues that internal labor markets were directly influenced by
the presence and power of industrial trade unions. Quoting Paul Osterman, Stone
writes, unions pressed firms to “establish seniority arrangements and other protections
for job security that are the hallmarks of internal labor markets” despite employer
resistance. This practice outlined an “implicit security principle” where companies were
unable to easily terminate their least efficient workers, older workers were paid more
than the value of their marginal product, and employers were deprived of the flexibility to
make agile adjustments in response to growing competition or fluctuations in the labor
market.251 Despite Osterman’s implications on the contrary, Stone demonstrates that
internal labor markets predated the industrial trade union model. 252 She does admit,
however, that unions:
“Have adapted the internal labor market arrangements to workers’ needs by
regularizing the practices and enforcing the implicit promises they contain. Unions have
also achieved, through bargaining, higher wages, more safe and humane working
conditions, better fringe benefits, and fairer treatment for workers within internal labor
markets…. unions have often been successful in adapting job structures to workers’
needs.”253
In the 1930s, many unskilled or semiskilled workers were represented by the
Congress of Industrial Organizations - which would later merge with the American
Federation of Labor - who fortified solidarity between workers based on employment
status, not worker skill. Internal labor markets were further institutionalized through
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“union-designed grievance and arbitration systems” that worked to implicitly guarantee
“job security and orderly promotion.”254 They also enforced narrow job definitions that
“forced employers to utilize more workers than might have been necessary to complete
specific tasks” for the sake of ensuring greater job security for a given workforce.255 In
this way, unions promoted behavior that contradicted market norms for the sake of
worker security. After the 1955 merger, the AFL-CIO made its primary objective to
“emphasize collective bargaining and contract administration as the core function of
unionism.” Stone notes that unions have been “extremely effective” in navigating
collective bargaining.256 Data captured by the General Social Survey indicates that,
since the 1970s, actual job insecurity grew at a less rapid rate for unionized workers
than for nonunion workers.257 However, perceived risk did not differ among union and
nonunion workers, likely due to the fact that workers belonging to unions are more apt
to express dissatisfaction at their place of work. Peter Marsden infers that unions play a
significant role “in mobilizing discontent by providing members with a voice option as an
alternative to exiting the workplace.”258
In What Do Unions Do? Richard Freeman & James Medoff examine two different
perspectives towards unions and their role in the workplace, labor force, and economy
at large. Freeman and Medoff argue that unions have two faces: The Monopoly Face
and the Collective Voice/Institutional Response Face. The Monopoly Face perspective
contends that unions channel their monopolistic control in the labor market to raise
wages above competitive levels, which consequently reduces national output and
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distorts the distribution of income. Unions are monopolistic in the sense that they amass
“collective organizations of workers with diverse interests…[and] bargain over wages
with employers… [but their] ability to raise wages is limited by the fact that… higher
union wages will induce employers to reduce employment.” In an environment where
unions are forced to compete in a free market, without monopolistic control, their longterm viability would be at risk. Freeman and Medoff postulate that in such an
environment, “unions could survive… [by] organizing [an] entire industry or sector.”
They could also survive by “organizing firms with the lowest costs of production, raising
wages at the expense of above-normal profits.” Union organizing tactics are most potent
in noncompetitive firms that can raise wage-rates without endangering their long-term
viability.259 There are some clear parallels to draw between the environment envisioned
by Freeman & Medoff and the labor market Gig and On-Demand workers navigate. If
Gig and On-Demand workers were to collectively organize, it would make sense for
them to be organized across entire industries rather than a firm-by-firm basis due to the
flexible nature of their work. Gig and On-Demand workers are able to find work through
multiple platforms. Additionally, production costs for firms like Uber or TaskRabbit are
very low and these firms in particular could maintain long-term profitability while also
offering larger commissions.
From the perspective of the Collective Voice/Institutional Response Face,
industrial trade unions are a mechanism that allow workers to collectively negotiate and
communicate with managers. Unions endow workers with “‘Voice’... the use of direct
communication to bring actual and desired conditions closer together.”260 Whether a
259

Freeman, Richard B., and James L. Medoff. What Do Unions Do? New York: Basic, 1984. Print. 6-7.
Freeman and Medoff. What Do Unions Do? 8.

260

87

given workforce wants to discuss the quality of a product produced by a firm or the
subpar working conditions within that firm, Voice equips workers with the capacity to
formulate an institutional response to management. Through this mechanism, safety
conditions and the speed of production in a given workplace have been determined
through collective organization. What’s more, collective Voice allows workers to reveal
their “true preferences to an employer” without fear of termination.261Of course, federal
law only guarantees collective Voice protections to workers classified as employees,
which complicates the ability of Gig and On-Demand workers to collectively advocate
for their needs.
Proponents of the “Monopoly Face” perspective argue that wage gains for
unionized workers provoke growing inequality in the overall labor market. In their view,
union-led wage-setting practices tend to displace nonunion workers, which increases
the supply of nonunion labor, subsequently reducing their wages. Proponents of the
“Voice/Response” perspective suggest a different causal relationship:
“Union decisions are based on a political process in which the majority rules, and
given that the majority of workers are likely to have earnings below average in any
workplace, unions can be expected to seek to reduce wage inequality within firms.”
From this point of view, unions work to shrink the role managers play in the
wage-setting process; they help establish equal pay for workers in the same job as
opposed to institutionalizing wage-rates that abide by the “manager’s perception of
individual merit.”262
In an attempt to mitigate the two contrasting perspectives, Freeman & Medoff
conducted their own study concerning the role of unions in the American labor force.
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Their “most far-reaching conclusion is that, in addition to well-advertised effects on
wages, unions alter nearly every other measurable aspect of the operation of
workplaces and enterprises, from turnover to productivity to profitability to the
composition of pay packages.”263 Overall, unions are found to have a positive influence
on the social and economic system: in most cases they are associated with greater
efficiency, a reduction in overall income inequality, and increased “economic and
political freedom.”264 Freeman & Medoff admit that there are drawbacks to unions, but
such drawbacks are a minor part of the overall equation. Focusing on the undesirable
effects of unions is, in their words, an “exceedingly inaccurate representation of what
unions do.”265
Other studies indicate that union workers receive a clear wage and benefit
advantage compared to nonunion workers. This has been referred to as the union wage
premium, however, contemporary union workers procure the greatest advantage in the
form of total compensation. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ National
Compensation Survey for March 2015, 79% of union workers participate in job-provided
health insurance, whereas only 49% of nonunion workers do.266Additionally, the AFLCIO reports that 76% of union workers participate in defined-benefit pension plans
whereas only 16% of nonunion workers do and 83% of union workers receive paid sick
leave whereas only 62% of nonunion workers do.267 The vast majority of union workers
receive vital protections and benefits many nonunion workers struggle to obtain. Union
workers, on average, also earn $300 more in median weekly earnings than their
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nonunion peers.268 Despite the gap in earnings, the most striking discrepancy between
the two segments of workers is the gap in benefits. The numbers outlined by the AFLCIO indicate that unions work with managers to negotiate compensation packages that
ensure much greater security and stability than is otherwise the case. Many nonunion
firms fail to provide workers with private-pension plans, healthcare, or paid sick leave.
For these workers, the issue isn’t a wage gap; it’s that they don’t receive crucial
protections altogether.

A. Historical Parallels to Worker
Organization in the Gig and On-Demand
Economy
Simply surveying the role organized labor and collective bargaining plays in
American history is not sufficient in attempting to understand the needs of workers in
the Gig and On-Demand economy. When looking towards the past in surmising the
needs of the future, it is critical to acknowledge historical parallels. The Writers Guild of
America is one such example of an organization that caters to the needs of a highly
flexible and nonpermanent sector of the economy: writers in the entertainment industry.
The organization first formed in 1933 as the Screenwriters Guild, and throughout out its
decades-long existence, has sought to mediate disputes concerning the “ownership of
creative work, the adjudication of credits, and the liminal boundaries of membership and
community.”269Similar to working in the Gig and On-Demand economy, screenwriting is
“varied and collaborative… [and] often rote.”270 The ability to transplant words from
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paper to screen requires the support and interest of multiple parties. Some have
classified screenwriting as “no collar” labor, as writers work flexible hours and often
write from home or in a coffee shop.271
The life of a screenwriter is one where the individual is largely in control of their
own work schedule, not dissimilar to Uber drivers or Taskers. Generally speaking, in
terms of income, these workers earn what they put into their work, unlike wage-laborers
who are paid by the hour rather than for the individual tasks completed. At its inception,
the Guild’s purpose was to “establish uniform working conditions for all writers within the
motion picture industry” and to protect writers from transgressions like undue salary cuts
or not being properly credited for their content they write.272 The Guild also introduced a
merit-based membership system where “active membership required meeting one of
three criteria: three months of studio employment as a staff writer, a screen credit for a
feature film, or three screen credits on film shorts.” Writers who didn’t meet this criteria
were relegated to “junior status.”273 The Guild didn’t gain traction because writers were
clamoring for union representation, they simply desired a mechanism through which to
openly communicate and negotiate with studio heads; it offered a means to acquire
leverage in their business dealings. This was of great importance to writers working in
Hollywood’s dog-eat-dog environment where younger, less experienced, and lower-paid
workers needed some form of institutional support. By 1940, the Guild aspired to fight
for both “long-term employees and independent contractors” by constructing a “two-tier
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contract for employees and independent writers” in order to secure “the rights of all
professional screenwriters.”274
As the Guild grew in size and scope, it faced some bumps along the road. In
1954, the Screenwriters Guild re-branded itself as the Writers Guild of America, now
representing writers for film, radio, and television. The now massive Guild separated
itself into two branches, one on the West coast and one on the East. The WGA
amalgamated the Screenwriters Guild, the Radio Writers Guild, and the Television
Writers Guild.275 Following the merger, it became evident that writers in different forms
of entertainment have different needs. For example, most Hollywood screenwriters
typically worked under contract whereas many television writers worked freelance.
Thus, negotiating as one large umbrella organization made it harder to satisfy the needs
of all WGA members. However, the WGA’s massive size and wide range of interests
allowed for powerful expressions of solidarity. For instance, if film screenwriters wanted
to strike due to a dispute with studio heads, the WGA could pool resources from other
union members working in other forms of entertainment, who would not go on strike, in
order to fund the strike in Hollywood.276 Thus, despite the fact that writers in various
entertainment mediums have different needs, being grouped together under one
umbrella organization granted them significant leverage in asserting collective power
during labor disputes.
The dwindling clout of American union power is well-known and the WGA is not
exempt from this trend. In the late 20th and early 21st century, major media outlets
began to conglomerate. With the growing strength of media conglomerates, “labor’s
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position became more precarious… [writers] saw deregulation as a step backward, a
loss of creative control, and a harbinger of what writing would be like in this new
conglomerated landscape.”277 Despite labor’s diminished influence, the WGA continued
to test the limits of collective action. During the 2007-08 WGA strike, union members
turned to the internet in order to garner sympathy from the general public. When the
writers of America’s Next Top Model went on strike, they turned to Myspace and
YouTube to befriend “thousands of fans” and post updates online. The writers “made
their case - for health benefits, residuals, regulated wages, and a pension plan - visible
not only on the streets of Los Angeles but also in virtual communities.”278 The WGA’s
tactics in this scenario demonstrate the potential for online communities to align
themselves with the labor movement, especially when it involves industries consumers
are invested in. The same tactics can be, and in some ways already have been,
employed by Uber drivers, Airbnb users, and others working for labor-brokering OnDemand platforms.
A more contemporary organization that offers a historical parallel for organizing
contingent and Gig workers, and one that has already been mentioned, is the
Freelancers Union. Founded by Sara Horowitz in 1995, the union started as an
organization called Working Today. Initially, the organization sought to advocate for
freelancers by lobbying and forming relationships with policymakers in New York state.
During this period, freelancing was far more common in cities like New York than in
most regions of the country. One source claims that 30% of freelancers in New York
City are “well educated and well paid… [and have] earned a college or graduate
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degree.”279 Some contend that, in terms of government-sponsored benefits and
collective bargaining rights, freelancers have been relegated to second-class status
since the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act. The Act “expressly excluded independent workers...
from the definition of ‘employee.”280 As consequence, Gig workers are not covered by
vital New Deal legislation that was designed to protect employees. Freelancers are
exempt from many anti-discrimination protections, and prior to the Affordable Care Act,
many of these workers found health insurance inaccessible, especially those who have
preexisting conditions.
Working Today was established with the goal of reforming America’s “social
safety net [and] developing systems so that people in nontraditional employment
arrangements can access affordable benefits.”281 In its formative phase, Working Today
applied a “two-pronged approach” with the launch of the Freelancers Union in 2001 and
its efforts to educate both policymakers and the public about the needs of contingent
workers. The goal of the Freelancers Union is to bring workers together in order to offer
its members “access to benefits at reasonable rates” through its Portable Benefits
Network. Aspiring members must meet certain criteria, such as working in one of the
Union’s “six qualified industries” and having “worked at least twenty hours per week for
the eight weeks prior to joining the plan, or [having] earned $10,000 during the six
months prior to joining.”282 Working Today successfully lobbied insurance companies to
establish group-plans for its members, providing roughly 4,000 freelancers with
affordable healthcare.
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Today, the Freelancers Union is still in operation, as evidenced by the
Freelancers in America report published in 2015. It’s important to note that the Union is
not a functional substitute for postwar labor unions. Where postwar labor unions
advocate for workers by negotiating collective bargaining agreements in a given
workplace, the Freelancers Union replicates the behavior of 19th century friendly
societies. The organization’s primary function is offering mutual aid: The Union gathers
its members resources in order to provide them with some form of social insurance. The
Freelancers Union “is one of the nation’s fastest-growing labor organizations, with more
than 200,000 members,” primarily from New York State.283 Horowitz hopes the
organization will boast one million members by 2016 (it is unclear whether or not they
have approached this number).
Instead of bargaining with employers, the Union’s central purpose, as of 2013, is
providing members with affordable health insurance. At its height, the Freelancers
Union’s health insurance apparatus, which was forced to shutdown after the enactment
of the Affordable Care Act, covered “23,000 workers in New York” and earned “$105
million in annual revenue.”284 Horowitz believes that the Freelancers Union has set itself
apart from traditional labor unions because, while still large and influential, the
organization is more akin to “old guilds… that focused on workers’ individual autonomy,
trying to build their own careers, with the backing of a collective organization to assist
them.”285 She sees the Union as a means to endow Gig workers with “meaningful
independence” by allowing them to navigate a precarious environment with the support
of a larger organization. “That’s what the new mutualism is about,” says Horowitz,
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“bring[ing] people together without” forcing them to lose “any individual aspects of
themselves.”286 With the Freelancers Union, Sara Horowitz is aiming for a pragmatic
approach towards organizing Gig workers. Their way of life is one of intrinsic risk, but
this reality doesn’t disqualify them from joining an organization that amalgamates their
interests. “We serve workers 360 degrees,” says Horowitz, “it’s not just about their work.
It’s about their whole life.”287
Seeing as the On-Demand economy is inextricably linked with the Internet and
digital platforms, it is helpful to survey recent collective bargaining attempts within digital
enterprises. In June 2015, the staff of Gawker Media voted to unionize and join the East
coast branch of the WGA. 75% of the staff voted in favor of the measure and 25% voted
against it.288 Prior to the vote, some staff members took to the comments section to
voice why they voted for or against the measure. One of the highest-rated comments in
support of unionization was posted by staff member Anna Merlan. She notes that she
very much enjoys working for Gawker media, and that while “we’re in a very good place
right now… we also exist in a bubble. When it bursts, I’d like us to have fair labor
practices in place to protect everyone and provide for them in the event of
‘downsizing.’”289 She insists that, “we need a grievance structure in place, in case we’re
ever working for people who aren’t as cool as [Executive Editors] Tommy Craggs and
Lacey Donohue.” Perhaps Merlan’s perspective is validated by the fact that, in July
2015, Craggs did indeed part ways with Gawker.
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Despite the support Merlan’s comment received from coworkers and Gawker
readers, other staff members voiced concern towards the unionization process. In
another comment that received high-ratings, staff member Kevin Draper, a self-avowed
“leftist,” states that he is “going to vote against” the measure.290 Draper insists that he is
in support of Gawker unionizing but that he is far too “disillusioned by the process we
have undertaken so far” and has little faith in “our ability to band together and negotiate
a contract that improves our collective standing.”291 Another dissenter, Leslie Horn,
insinuates that the WGAE has rushed the unionization process for the sake of “positive
PR.” She notes that Gawker would be “the first digital media company to unionize” and
that the “editorial staff has been rushed to vote on whether or not to unionize.”292 Maybe
the best course of action would be to unionize outside the auspices of the WGAE.
In March 2016, Gawker media ratified their collective bargaining agreement. The
contract recognizes the WGAE as “the sole and exclusive bargaining agent” in
negotiating wage-rates and employment conditions “for all full-time and regular part-time
non-executive editorial employees.”293 The contract also institutionalizes the benefits
packages Gawker already guarantees employees, sets terms for “grievance
procedure[s]” (thereby endowing workers with Voice), and establishes minimum salaries
for various job titles.294 Gawker has established itself as the first digital media outlet to
abide by the norms and practices of traditional labor unions.
Staff members at another digital media outlet, Al Jazeera America, also voted to
form a union in October 2015. The vote, administered by the National Labor Relations
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Board, passed by a margin of 32-5. Some employees have accused Al Jazeera
America’s management of “delay[ing] and defer[ing]” attempts to collectively organize.
While the company has published statements voicing support for the collective
bargaining agreement, management has continued “to limit the size of the bargaining
unit by nine people, out of a total of 50” and dispute “who qualified as management and
who did not.”295 Eventually, the company relented, and publicly affirmed that they
“respect the decision [our employees] have reached through this democratic vote.”296

II.

History of Government-Sponsored Benefits, Voice, and
Countervailing Power
The American government has never played as active a role in the labor market

as some European governments but it has institutionalized some crucial forms of social
protection. In 1932, congress passed the Norris-La Guardia Act which codified a given
workforce’s right to organize and collectively bargain thereby prohibiting federal courts
from issuing “injunctions in many types of labor disputes.” In 1935, the National Labor
Relations Act granted workers “an enforceable right to engage in concerted action for
mutual aid and protection, to organize unions of their own choosing, and to engage in
collective bargaining.” The NLRA gave rise to the National Labor Relations Board, the
body responsible for enforcing collective bargaining rights. And in 1937, The Fair Labor
Standards Act established a federal minimum wage and “set maximum hours for
employment.”297 These three pieces of legislation, along with others, served to define
industrial employment relationships for nearly a century. Legislation passed during the
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New Deal era bestowed American workers with institutional support in the form of
collective bargaining rights and humane working conditions.
New Deal era legislation was also complemented by landmark Supreme Court
rulings. Two cases in particular were notably significant. First, the reversal of the West
Coast Hotel v. Parrish ruling established that state-based, rather than federal, attempts
to set minimum wages for women’s labor is constitutional. Two years later, in
Jones and Laughlin v. NLRB, the Court found the NLRB to be “a constitutional exercise
of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.”298 During this period, all branches
of the federal government worked to embolden American workers and institute a baselevel of stability in the labor market.
Perhaps one of the most significant pieces of legislation passed during the New
Deal is the Social Security Act. Roughly 167 million American workers pay Social
Security taxes and 59 million people, primarily retirees and their dependents, receive
monthly payments from the program. Social Security’s intended purpose is to replace
~40% “of an average wage earner’s income after retiring.”299 To be eligible for Social
Security benefits one must either be retired, disabled, survivors of workers who have
died, and/or dependents of beneficiaries. One common misconception about Social
Security is that, when an individual pays the Social Security tax, the payment is
allocated towards that individual’s personal Social Security account. Instead, the
program allocates today’s taxes towards payments for current recipients.
The Social Security & Medicare tax operates in a way that benefits workers
classified as employees. Those employed for some one else pay a 6.2% Social Security
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tax and a 1.45% Medicare tax; their employers match those rates. On the other hand,
self-employed and nontraditional workers have to foot the bill for both themselves and
the non-existent employer: they must pay a 12.4% Social Security tax and a 2.9%
Medicare tax.300 An individual’s eligibility for Social Security benefits is dictated by a
“credits” system. In 2015, individuals earn one credit for each $1,220 they make in
earnings and are limited to four credits per year. Most individuals “need 40 credits (10
years of work) to qualify for benefits.” There are some exceptions in the case of young
people in need of disability payments or dependents of current recipients.301 Medicare is
typically associated with Social Security when discussing government-sponsored
protections as it is the quintessential health insurance program for American seniors.
Both Social Security and Medicare were formulated with traditional employment
relationships in mind. As previously stated, Social Security is a government-sponsored
pension system designed to replace ~40% of a recipient’s income. Therefore, Social
Security payments are intended to be supplemented by a private pension provided by a
recipient’s (former) employer. The program operates under a two-pronged approach
where workers receive relatively ungenerous payments through Social Security with the
assumption that they also receive payments through a separate employer-sponsored
pension program. In principle, the two pension plans amalgamate to fortify a sustainable
standard of living for recipients. In the postwar era, labor unions negotiated with
employers to advocate for employer-sponsored pension plans; this is no longer the case
in the Gig and On-Demand economy. Thus, Social Security was designed for an
employment environment that millions of American workers no longer navigate. For Gig
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and On-Demand workers, Social Security does not operate as intended, and no
functional substitute currently exists. The comparison between Social Security’s efficacy
in the postwar labor market and the Gig and On-Demand labor market is analogous to a
living wage versus a minimum wage; For Gig and On-Demand workers, Social Security
offers bare-minimum support. What’s more, the transformation of the American labor
market, as outlined in Chapter 1, poses problems for Gig and On-Demand workers
when it comes to to qualifying for Social Security payments. The program’s credits
system was formulated with the assumption that American workers derive their income
from a single employer rather than multiple job-providers. The program does ensure
credits for “self-employed” workers by allowing them to earn a credit “for each $1,260 in
net earnings,” but again, the Social Security and Medicare tax for self-employed
individuals is twice as high as it is for conventional employees.302 In the Gig and OnDemand economy, Social Security acts as a barebones safety net rather than one
factor in a larger equation.
Another crucial component of the American safety net is the Unemployment
insurance benefits system. The program was constructed with the goal of serving
Americans who are unemployed for reasons outside of their control. Unemployment
insurance payments are intended to provide temporary financial assistance. Each state
administers their own program that abides by federal guidelines. Thus, state-level
officeholders can determine the rules surrounding eligibility for benefits, benefit payment
rates, and the duration of eligibility. In order to qualify for UI, individuals must “meet the
State requirements for wages earned or time worked during an established period of
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time referred to as a ‘base period.’” Furthermore, they must also “be determined to be
unemployed through no fault of [their] own (determined under State law), and meet
other eligibility requirements of State law.” In a majority of states, Unemployment
insurance payments are exclusively funded by taxes imposed on employers.303
Clearly, states hold a considerable level of autonomy in administering the
Unemployment insurance program. The program also assumes that recipients, prior to
unemployment, were engaged in a traditional employer-employee relationship. In
general, the benefits one receives are based on a percentage of their income over a
recent 52-week period.304 Unemployment insurance is jointly financed through both
federal and state employer payroll taxes:
“Generally, employers must pay both state and Federal unemployment taxes if:
(1) they pay wages to employees totaling $1,500, or more, in any quarter of a calendar
year; or, (2) they had at least one employee during any day of a week during 20 weeks
in a calendar year, regardless of whether or not the weeks were consecutive. However,
some state laws differ from the Federal law and employers should contact their state
workforce agencies to learn the exact requirements.”305
A Self-Employment Assistance program is also administered through the
Unemployment insurance benefits system. This sub-program “offers dislocated workers
the opportunity for early re-employment. The program is designed to encourage and
enable unemployed workers to create their own jobs by starting their own small
businesses.” Through this mechanism, states can pay an “SEA allowance” in lieu of
regular unemployment insurance benefits to help unemployed workers build a business
and become self-employed. Recipients receive a weekly allowance. Currently, only
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Delaware, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Vermont
take part in the program.306 Seeing as the Unemployment insurance program was
constructed with traditional workers in mind, perhaps the SEA’s model can be
appropriated to benefit Gig and On-Demand workers subjected to long-term job
dislocation.
In March 2010, the Obama administration successfully spearheaded the passage
of the Affordable Care Act. The ACA’s ultimate goal was to expand access to affordable
health care, but the legislation has also benefited contingent workers by increasing the
portability of health insurance. The ACA allows workers to “change jobs or insurers
without danger of losing access to coverage or having benefits excluded because of a
pre-existing condition.”307 In the context of healthcare, portability describes the ability for
an employee to “maintain access to health insurance coverage and comprehensive
benefits” following the cessation of a given employment relationship. Portability also
refers “to the ability of those purchasing insurance on their own to drop one insurance
policy and buy another.”308 Thanks to the ACA, insurers can no longer deny coverage
because of an applicant’s pre-existing conditions or impose premium surcharges due to
the applicant’s health status or claims record.
The Brookings Institute also notes that the health insurance exchange model
established by the ACA should serve as a model for a reformed benefits-system built to
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serve Gig and On-Demand workers.309 Lawrence Summers, former Secretary of the
Treasury, believes that “with the passage of the Affordable Care Act, a significant
element of economic security is guaranteed within the United States regardless of
employment status.”310 The same level of economic security is not guaranteed by other
elements of the American safety net, including Social Security or the Unemployment
insurance system.
MBO Partners has also weighed in on the discussion surrounding the ACA and
the nonpermanent labor force. According to their data, the number of “full-time
Independents” with health insurance has significantly climbed from 64% in 2013 to 82%
in 2015.311 Emergent Research claims that the “increase in coverage can largely be
attributed to the Affordable Care Act… which went into effect in 2014.”312 The firm
claims that the ACA introduces both “carrot and stick incentives” for Gig and OnDemand workers; health care is more affordable and accessible but the individual
mandate imposes fines on individuals who don’t sign up for a health care plan. The firm
concludes that the ACA has proven itself “a good thing” for most Gig and On-demand
workers by making their lives “easier and more secure.”313
The ACA makes healthcare more accessible through the insurance exchange
model. October 1, 2013 marked the launch of the Health Insurance Marketplace, the
venue on which individuals - not covered by employer-sponsored healthcare, Medicare,
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or Medicaid - can “shop” for an insurance plan. Marketplaces are managed by a state’s
government or the federal government if a state doesn’t establish its own marketplace.
There are various levels of coverage: Bronze, Silver, Gold, and Platinum; Bronze plans
are the cheapest (covering ~60% of healthcare costs) and Platinum plans are the most
expensive (covering ~90% of healthcare costs). The exchange model also expands
access to health care subsidies and tax credits. If an individual reports drastic
fluctuations in income the subsidies will adjust in response.314 This is especially helpful
for Gig and On-Demand workers who don’t maintain a reliable stream of income.
With the ACA comes some crucial protections: “individuals who earn below
roughly $46,000 and families of four who earn less than $94,000 are likely to qualify for
federal tax credits” when shopping on state or federal exchanges.315 The law also
allows for private insurance exchanges, like the Freelancers Union’s now defunct health
insurance company, which offered “group rates to workers in certain areas of New
York.” The downside is that if private plans don’t meet “minimum requirements”
members may be forced to pay the individual mandate.316
In 2014, the Freelancers Union ended its private insurance company because
the ACA made its existence unfeasible. The Union’s leaders insist that the company
“would have [had] to raise premiums by 14 percent across the board” in order to stay in
business and such price hikes would pose “a direct conflict with [the Freelancers
Union’s] reason for going into the insurance business in the first place.” Sara Horowitz
says that it would have been challenging “to offer insurance at [the] levels required by
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the Affordable Care Act.” Instead, the Freelancers Insurance Company’s members were
automatically enrolled in “one of an array of Empire BlueCross BlueShield plans with
benefits that the union says mirror what it has, an assertion some members dispute.”317
The closure of the Freelancers Union’s private insurance company presents a potential
downside of the ACA. Leslie Moran, a spokeswoman for a New York insurance trade
group, says that the closure of the FIC “underscore[s] the realities of the Affordable
Care Act in terms of some of the costs that are imposed on companies trying to provide
benefits to consumers.”318
Paul Osterman contends that the ACA “doesn’t necessarily increase the
portability of benefits… [but it does] provide a safety net for those who don’t have
employer-based benefits.”319 He states that, if one considers health care as an issue
that is now “taken care of,” he is unsure whether the ACA could serve as the model for
a broader portable benefits system outside of health care. Furthermore, Osterman notes
that not as many employers provide workers with pension plans the way they do health
care.320 With health insurance, if an individual finds a plan through the insurance
exchange, their healthcare needs are entirely satisfied. The public pension system
America has in place, as has been discussed, is Social Security, which is inadequate for
workers without a private pension plan due to its two-pronged approach. Currently,
there is no government-sponsored program that enhances the portability of private
pension plans. Such a system would be highly beneficial for workers in the Gig and OnDemand economy.
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III.

Old Protections Are No Longer Viable
At this point, it is safe to conclude that labor relationships in the Gig and On-

Demand economy challenge longstanding norms in the American labor market. Postwar
labor standards are an anachronism. Today, firms face more competition and their
“fundamental organizational structures” have been called into question, advancements
in technology allow for new methods of management and control over a given
workforce, and the “financial community” has much more influence over “the motivation
and objectives of firms.”321 Pay-setting practices have drifted from postwar norms, a
transformation that Paul Osterman chalks up to the waning influence of labor unions.
The ability for unions to shape managerial behavior in both union and nonunion firms
has greatly diminished. Osterman argues that public policy must address the imbalance
of power in the labor market by “building effective institutions for facilitating [labor]
mobility.”322
Existing government-sponsored protections must be updated as well: Osterman
notes that the Unemployment insurance benefits system is biased against non
permanent workers because the system is predicated on serving individuals who have
lost full-time jobs rather than workers who operate outside of the full-time employment
paradigm. Self-employed workers are excluded.323 Gig and On-Demand workers should
be protected by a portable benefits system that isn’t tied to a single employer. They
should also have the ability to consult some form of labor intermediary that advocates
for their needs. The construction of such a labor intermediary doesn’t necessarily
require government intervention through public policy, but the long-term objectives of
321

Osterman. Securing Prosperity. 33-36.
Osterman. Securing Prosperity. 117.
323
Osterman. Securing Prosperity. 126-127.
322

107

firms in the Gig and On-Demand economy, from a structural perspective, must shift.
Workers need an institutional mechanism to engage with their managers.324 The
contemporary labor market is fluid and public policies must serve to protect people in
the midst of a job search; perhaps local labor market institutions could make this task
more manageable. The current safety net outlined by public policy envisions a labor
market that is relatively static.325 Workers operate in new terrain but the rules that
dictate their ability to navigate that terrain are stuck in the 20th century.
What’s more, the collective power of labor has nearly disintegrated. In the mid1950s, “the unionization rate was greater than one in three workers; now it’s closer to
one in nine [in the public sector]... and one in 16 in the private sector.”326 It just so
happens that labor’s decline coincides with decreased living standards for the American
working class. Organized labor no longer holds the leverage it once did in bargaining
with employers for better wages, job security, or safety-net provisions.327 Lawrence
Summers notes that, as the “traditional employer-employee relationship” has unraveled,
it is “more difficult to provide [workers with] basic economic security.”328 As a result,
working families are forced bear the burden of risk with only the bottom-of-the-barrel
welfare system providing them any form of institutional support.
Laura Tyson offers yet another perspective that bemoans the deficiency of
government-sponsored protections. She believes that, in the Gig and On-Demand
economy, benefits should be tied to individual workers rather than their employment
relationships. These protections should be universal, “applying to all workers and all
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forms of employment,” and they should be “pro-rated, linking employer benefit
contributions to time worked, jobs completed, or income earned.”329 Recall that in late
2015, a group of business and labor leaders in the Gig and On-Demand economy
penned an open letter calling for the institutional reform of government-sponsored
protections. Among their demands was a “portable vehicle for worker protections and
benefits.” 330 The American safety net should allow for increased independence, ensure
pro-rated and universal protections, and encourage innovation when it comes to
collective organization. Labor advocates in this sector of the economy acknowledge that
flexible work arrangements are inextricably linked with increased risk, but the risks Gig
and On-Demand workers currently face are far too daunting.

A. Unraveling of Government-Sponsored Protections
In a labor market best defined by stability and predictability, it makes sense for
employers to be responsible for providing full-time employees with health care, private
pension plans, and unemployment insurance. But, as has been proven, many
Americans live outside of this reality. “It makes no sense to have a well-developed
safety net for one category of employment and virtually none for other kinds of
productive work,” says Professor Sundararajan.331 Senator Mark Warner reiterates this
point: “Somebody may be doing very, very well as an… Airbnb user and Uber driver and
part-time consultant… but if they hit a rough patch, they have nothing to stop them until
they fall… back upon government assistance programs.”332 In these cases, taxpayers
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are forced to subsidize Gig and On-Demand workers due to the inadequacies of
existing public policies. In the instance of tragedy – an Uber driver gets in a car
accident, a Tasker gets injured - there is no safety net for these workers to fall back on
besides the public coffers. This is not sustainable, especially when the Gig and OnDemand economy is growing. Even Uber CEO Travis Kalanick admits that worker
benefits should be portable, universal, and pro-rated.333
While policymakers have been criticized for dragging their feet when it comes to
introducing new forms of protections, some officeholders have made the call for
transformation. United States Secretary of Labor Tom Perez is concerned “that some
observers have framed [the debate surrounding protections in Gig and On-Demand
economy as] a false choice of protecting workers OR promoting innovation… There are
scores of innovative employers who reject this false choice as well.”334 He points to
tackling the issue of employee misclassification as a priority for the Department of Labor
and insists that “it is a false choice to suggest that complying with common sense
consumer and worker protection laws creates a barrier to innovation.”335 Senate
Democrats Bob Casey and Al Franken have even introduced a bill to address employee
misclassification. In a press release published in July 2015, the two Senators argue that
“when a worker is wrongly classified as an independent contractor, there is a denial of
basic protections like fair labor standards, health and safety protections.” Senators
Casey and Franken co-authored The Payroll Fraud Prevention Act with the intention of
protecting employees from being misclassified as independent contractors, “thereby
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ensuring access to safeguards like fair labor standards, health and safety protections,
and unemployment and workers’ compensation benefits.”336
Outside of employee misclassification, some younger office-holders have raised
questions about the Gig and On-Demand economy. In May 2015, a bipartisan “Sharing
Economy Caucus” was formed with the goal of “bring[ing] attention to this booming
sector and its impact on our society and economy.” Sharing Economy Caucus members
publicly cite Uber and Airbnb as inspirations for its formation.337 Policymakers have yet
to substantively address the dangers of the Gig and On-Demand economy but they
have at least begun to set their sights on the issue.

B. Unraveling of Workplace Based
Protections
Sara Horowitz believes that the “new psychological contract” that defines
American employment relationships makes it so both employers and employees have
low expectations for long-term commitment, security, and internal promotional
opportunities.338 It’s important to emphasize that many Americans continue to work for
large firms, similar to the ones that helped institutionalize the “old psychological
contract,” but that, increasingly, many of these workers are not classified as
employees.339 In these cases, tasks are either assigned to temporary workers or
outsourced altogether. The modern American firm strives for “affective commitment,”
where a worker internalizes the firm’s objectives and makes it their goal “to do what is
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best for the organization,” as opposed to “continuance commitment,” which is a worker’s
“commitment to stay with an organization.”340
Some academics are of the opinion that workers in the Gig and On-Demand
economy should employ collective organizing tactics that are rooted in social
connections. This strategy accentuates communal coalition building and grassroots
mobilization in order to exert collective pressure on a given firm.341 One academic
argues that the capacity for “social unionism” to achieve tangible gains is based upon
two factors. First, the “range of opportunity” available to a would-be union in a given
context; this refers to the strength of existing institutional arrangements like local
governments or business owners. The other factor is concerned with the steps taken by
existing organizations to advocate for workers; organizers must seize any opportunities
to acquire influence within existing power structures.342 This approach towards worker
mobilization is unique in that it isn’t dependent on governmental intervention. Sara
Horowitz has praised non-governmental approaches towards organizing workers, but
she also acknowledges that the government plays a key role in ensuring “sustainable
flexibility,” where the government “enable[s] and empower[s]” workers in order to
construct a sustainable support system.343
Today, industrial union power has dwindled. Katherine Stone postulates that
unions need to reestablish their ability to strengthen communal bonds by providing
mutual assistance, especially for immigrant workers. She argues that unions must
embrace New Craft unionism, “an occupation based form of unionism that bargains with
340
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industry-wide employer groups to establish minimum standards and provide training” as
well as enable “employees to move freely between employers in [an] industry.” She also
points to Citizen Unionism, a “locality-based form of unionism that uses collective
pressure to induce corporations to become good corporate citizens of the geographic
area in which they are located.”344 Citizen Unionism is somewhat similar to social
unionism: both methods have the goal of organizing workers based on geographic
proximity and the strengthening of communal bonds. Additionally, the Freelancers
Union operates in a way that abides by some of the principles outlined by New Craft
and Citizen Unionism. Instead of bargaining with individual firms, the Freelancers Union
endows its members - who work for multiple firms in the same sector of the economy with “mutual aid” by representing them “360 degrees.”345 All three of Stone’s ideas imply
that today’s workforce is in a much more precarious place: firms shed workers with
ease. Collective organizing practices must adapt, once again, to a world where workers
are not only more disposal, but also more easily recruited by firms. Labor advocates
must pivot towards communal and locally sourced organization rather than organizing
workers on a firm-by-firm basis.
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Chapter 4: Opportunities to Shape the Gig and On-Demand
Economy
I.

The Potential for On-Demand Platforms
In this concluding chapter of my Thesis I will discuss the potential of On-Demand

platforms and the ways in which institutions, public policies, and regulatory mechanisms
can be reformed in order to best serve workers in this sector of the economy. Discourse
surrounding the On-Demand economy tends to limit itself to present-day affairs. One
could go as far to say that the On-Demand economy, as a term, is synonymous with
today’s popular platforms, like Uber and Airbnb. The On-Demand economy has the
potential to offer so much more than ride- or room-sharing, and some firms have
already begun to push the envelope.
In Chapter 1, I discussed how app-based technology has worked to revitalize
antiquated industries, like door-to-door seltzer delivery in Brooklyn. The On-Demand
economy promises much more than a simple nostalgia trip. Doorbell Barbers sends a
barber to a user’s home at the push of a button.346 Barkly is an On-Demand service for
dog walkers (that allows users to meet up with would-be walkers beforehand).347
Kitchensurfing is an On-Demand service for private chefs, which subverts the
conventional model for app-based meal delivery platforms like GrubHub or Seamless.348
This sector of the economy is bustling with innovation and creativity, sparking demand
for services and forms of exchange not thought possible before the emergence of
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modern communications technologies. Still, these services are just scratching the
surface. I am most intrigued by platforms that have the potential to redefine the
provision of vital social services.
Imagine ordering a doctor to your home at the push of a button. Enter Heal, an
On-Demand house call service that promises medical care in two hours or less. The
platform promises users a “background-checked [and] licensed primary care physician”
who can be summoned to an individual’s home, or “literally wherever [they] are,” at their
own convenience for a $99 flat fee. Heal’s website also provides personal profiles for
every doctor available.349 As of March 2016, Heal’s area of operation is limited to
Southern California, but has steadily expanded. The care offered through the platform is
limited: “among other things, [physicians] can diagnose and treat moderate ailments like
bronchitis, give flu shots, stitch up a nasty cut or write a prescription.” Users have to file
insurance paperwork at their own convenience.350
Heal isn’t the first service of its kind, and one can hope that competition in this
sector will ensure quality care, but the platform’s existence does speak to the potential
of the On-Demand economy. Heal’s convenience and ease of access could greatly
enhance the standard of living for disabled and elderly Americans across the country.
Not to mention, services like Heal could prove to be highly profitable. Another platform,
Honor, provides an “Uber-like marketplace” that matches trained caregivers “with the
elderly and infirm.”351 In January 2016, Honor granted its workforce employee status.
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The workers classified as full-time employees became eligible for health benefits along
with stock equity.352
Honor offers promise in a sector of the economy that has subordinated millions of
workers. Not only does the platform have the potential to transform at-home care-giving
for the weakest among us, it does so with dignity. Where so many On-Demand
platforms fail to ensure stability for its workers, Honor has taken the initiative to do so.
Of course, it is relatively simple for a small firm like Honor to make this shift, as it has
been in operation for only a year or so. For Uber, this transition would be much more
disruptive and costly. Still, Honor’s efforts deserve recognition. “Our whole thing at the
get-go was that you can’t provide great care to someone if you’re not in a great place in
your own life,” says CEO Seth Sternberg.353 What’s more, On-Demand platforms can be
deployed in ways that benefit the public good. For example, in Saudi Arabia, Uber
offered free rides to women voting for the first time in the 2015 elections.354
On-Demand platforms also have the potential to promote global efficiency.
According to the McKinsey Global Institute, online job-matching platforms like LinkedIn
or UpWork “could add $2.7 trillion, or 2.0 percent, to global GDP and increase
employment by 72 million full-time-equivalent positions” by 2025. Furthermore, roughly
“540 million individuals could benefit from online talent platforms” by this same point in
time as they serve to decrease the length of an individual’s job-search. Nearly 200
million inactive or part-time workers could find additional work through job-matching
platforms. Through job-matching platforms, tens of millions of workers could find more
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preferential work arrangements and roughly 100 million “could shift from informal to
formal employment.”355 By 2025, On-Demand labor-brokering platforms could galvanize
labor force participation, reduce unemployment, and markedly increase labor
productivity.
For all the On-Demand economy has to offer there is some cause for concern.
Journalist Farhad Manjoo has declared “the end of the on-demand dream.”356 He notes
that, across the industry, “prices are rising, service is declining, business models are
shifting, and in some cases, companies are closing down.”357 Manjoo considers Uber’s
success an anomaly and bemoans efforts made by other start-ups to replicate its
business model. Steven Hill recently penned an editorial buttressing Manjoo’s
assessment. Hill contends that entrepreneurs are unable to recognize that, in most
cases, the On-Demand model “is not scalable or sustainable at the billionaire unicorn
level without ongoing [venture capitalist] welfare subsidies.”358 In the past couple years,
the On-Demand economy has operated under a gold rush mentality where some firms
managed to stayed afloat thanks to enthusiastic investors. Manjoo cites that, in 2016,
“investor appetite for on-demand companies has cooled.”359 It’s possible that this could
actually benefit the On-Demand economy. Without venture capitalists arbitrarily inflating
a given firm’s market value, companies will be forced to rely on consumers rather than
patrimony in order to thrive.
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Despite Manjoo’s claims on the contrary, TaskRabbit is on track to turn a profit in
2016 and both Uber and Airbnb have amassed jaw-dropping market values. The
successes of all three platforms surveyed in this Thesis indicate that firms can prosper
in the On-Demand economy. Any start-up is prone to failure. Even Steven Hill admits
that, outside of the On-Demand economy, “three out of four startups fail, and more than
nine out of 10 never earn a return.”360 On-Demand platforms, which brandish a form of
exchange less than two decades old, are even more prone to failure; business owners
are navigating new commercial terrain. It may be the case that only a handful of OnDemand firms can reach the level of Uber or Airbnb, but it’s far too early to label the OnDemand economy a bust. Valid as some of Manjoo’s concerns may be, the future of the
On-Demand economy is unclear and I am cautiously optimistic.
American workers have been drifting towards precarity for decades and many
pundits and academics have offered scathing critiques towards the labor conditions
found in the Gig and On-Demand economy. From a structural perspective, workers
have been left to fend for themselves. But services like Honor indicate that On-Demand
platforms deserve their own unique position in the American economy. At the essence
of the On-Demand economy lies accessibility, convenience, and opportunities to
generate consumer demand. The technology that underpins the existence of ridesharing, home-sharing, and on-demand labor-brokering platforms was nonexistent less
than two decades ago. For platforms like Heal and Honor - which offer vital services
through a remarkably accessible medium - to thrive, they cannot be subjected to the
same political and regulatory standards as traditional industries. Under conventional
standards, On-Demand firms would be forced to scale back the size of their labor
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forces, take larger cuts from their workers’ commissions, and consumers would be
subjected to longer wait times and face higher costs. In this scenario, fledgling OnDemand firms would also require larger sums of seed money in order to cover the
increased cost of starting a business in this sector of the economy. As a result, venture
capitalists would be less willing to invest in potentially groundbreaking endeavors. In the
On-Demand economy, onerous regulations would stifle innovation. Even On-Demand
skeptics, like Steven Hill, admit that the form of commercial exchange fostered in this
sector of the economy could redefine traditional industries “in ways that we can’t yet
anticipate."361 If On-Demand firms were compelled to abide by the same standards as
mid-20th century industrial firms, potential investors would be less willing to take
necessary risks, consumer appeal would be diminished, and potentially lucrative firms
would flounder.
The overall Gig economy embodies the casualization of American employment
relationships and is largely problematic for American workers. As a subset of the Gig
economy, the On-Demand economy shares some of these attributes. However, the OnDemand economy also has the potential to liberate American workers and provide
consumers with unique and potentially vital services. At the current point in time, OnDemand workers are suffering. Today, the size of the full-time On-Demand workforce is
minimal, but it will continue to grow as new platforms develop. What’s more, many
Americans are drawn towards On-Demand work, not as a source of primary income, but
as a source of supplementary income. Such individuals do not require the same forms
of protections as full-time employees. Workers in this sector of the economy require
legitimate forms of social protection, but such protections must adapt to the environment
361
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these workers navigate. It’s not sufficient to apply the rules and regulations that dictated
static labor relationships in the postwar industrial workplace to firms in the emerging OnDemand economy. They simply abide by different employment schematics.
The organizing tactics employed by Uber and Airbnb, as discussed in Chapter 2,
indicate that the technology that buttresses these platforms can be utilized to advocate
for the downtrodden and mobilize the grassroots. The same technology can be used to
painlessly provide benefits to On-Demand workers via micro-transactions. The OnDemand economy can serve to empower and liberate the American workforce. The
playing field just needs to be refined.

II.

What Solutions Best Serve Workers?
For decades, the postwar labor market was both stable and predictable. The

American workplace was characterized by industry-wide norms, consistent wage-setting
practices, and strong firm-worker commitment. The New Deal ushered in a virtuous
cycle where the firm acted as a family. Since the 1970s, the traditional employeremployee relationship has eroded. Workers find themselves in a much more precarious
state and are privy to long-term job dislocation. In the 21st century, workers are both
deployed and dismissed with great ease. At this point in time, the federal government
has failed to accurately detect the size of America’s Gig and On-Demand workforce.
Based on academic perspectives and studies conducted by private firms, it is evident
that roughly 30-50 million Americans are working in the Gig and On-Demand economy
in some capacity. This is compounded by the fact that the number of workers filing 1099
tax forms is outpacing that of W-2 forms.
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In an earlier era, firms prioritized garnering a formidable core of long-term
employees. This is no longer the case and the government has failed to reorient public
policies towards addressing the risks posed by the new employment landscape. Firms
in the On-Demand economy are distinct from traditional firms, therefore they should not
be regulated through the same mechanisms. Conventional policy prescriptions and
collective bargaining tactics are an anachronism in an environment where workers jump
job-to-job and bear the brunt of increased corporate instability. On-Demand platforms
have grown ubiquitous over the past few years due to technological advancements.
With new technology comes new means to exert control over workers, but concurrently,
new technology also provides a rubric for workers to organize and enhance communal
bonds. Today, the convenience of modern technology spells subjugation for the Gig and
On-Demand workforce; there is potential for it to offer empowerment.
On-Demand firms have readily taken advantage of an unregulated playing field.
Uber categorizes itself as a technology company rather than a transportation one. It
matches drivers with customers and takes a sizable cut from a driver’s commission.
Some studies have implied that the artificial management employed by Uber is more
domineering than human management. Many labor advocates have also questioned the
employment classification of Uber drivers: should they be classified as employees or
independent contractors? Some academics contend that neither category may satisfy
the needs of these workers. Airbnb is a global home-sharing platform that relies on trust
in lieu of regulation. Some users and pundits have taken umbrage with the lack of
protections offered to consumers. The platform’s verification process for renters is bareboned and Airbnb does not perform on-site investigations in regards to the safety of the
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space being rented. In some American cities, regulators have raised questions about
how the platform serves to hike local rental rates. In San Francisco, Airbnb deployed
guerilla organizing tactics in attempts to fend off potential regulation; Uber utilized
similar tactics in New York City. Many Gig and On-Demand workers resort to an eggsin-many-baskets strategy when it comes to employment security and few services better
embody this strategy than labor-brokering platforms like TaskRabbit and UpWork.
Labor-brokering platforms allow workers to diversify the range of jobs they perform, but
the ability for workers to set their own wage-rates provokes a race to the bottom that
leaves one’s income at the mercy of the market. In the On-Demand economy, traditional
employment channels and protections have been bypassed for the sake of convenience
and decreased operational costs. All of the aforementioned platforms have amassed
considerable market value, and in some ways liberated American workers, but they
have also rendered the American safety net ineffective in this sector of the economy.
In the postwar era, trade unions represented a sizable portion of the American
workforce. Thanks to the threat effect, their influence ebbed beyond unionized firms and
helped establish industry-wide norms that rewarded seniority, set stable job
classifications, and made it so most layoffs were followed by recall. Many firms
cultivated internal labor markets and unions provided an institutional apparatus for
workers to voice grievances and negotiate with managers. Quantitatively speaking,
unions work to fortify more substantial compensation packages for the workers they
represent than would otherwise be the case. Today, firm-based unionization is less
effective. A later section of this chapter will discuss how Gig and On-Demand workers
can gravitate towards a form of collective organizing that revolves around communal
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ties as well as the mutual aid these workers can provide one another. There are
historical precedents for organizing nontraditional workers. The Writers Guild of America
is a massive umbrella organization that represents writers in the entertainment industry,
and while it has struggled to satisfy the needs of all its members, it also provides an
institutional apparatus for expressions of solidarity. Since the 1990s, the Freelancers
Union has operated under the rubric of new mutualism: instead of coordinating with
employers directly, the Union offers its members pathways to affordable benefits as well
as empowerment vis-a-vis communal identity. Both organizations boast a merit-based
membership system. Recently, some online outlets like Gawker and Al-Jazeera have
unionized their labor forces; in these instances, some managers and workers have
voiced skepticism over the fact that these workers were organized through conventional
tactics and, in Gawker’s case, under the umbrella of a traditional labor organization.
During the New Deal era the American government institutionalized collective
organizing tactics and introduced vital protections, like Social Security. Social Security is
a government-pension system designed to replace ~40% of a beneficiary's income. The
program subsidizes a minimum pension that is intended to be supplemented by private
employer-based pensions. Less and less workers, especially those in the Gig and OnDemand economy, are provided private-pension programs through their work
arrangements. Furthermore, Gig and On-Demand workers, whose income is (at least
partially) derived by working task-to-task for multiple firms, struggle to qualify for
benefits due to the program’s credit-based system. They can classify themselves as
self-employed workers in order to amalgamate their income streams, but under this
classification, workers are forced to pay higher Social Security and Medicare tax rates.
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As of yet, there is no public-pension program that addresses the needs of Gig and OnDemand workers. The Unemployment Insurance system was also constructed with
long-term employees in mind. Individual states hold a considerable level of autonomy in
administering the program, which is reserved for dislocated workers found to be laid off
for reasons outside of their control, rather than contingent workers struggling to find
work. Finally, the most recent addition to welfare state, the Affordable Care Act, offers
some promise in terms of protecting Gig and On-Demand workers. Thanks to the ACA,
the accessibility of health insurance is no longer contingent upon an individual’s
employment status, and a significant number of Gig and On-Demand workers have
found a healthcare plan through the insurance exchange. The ACA’s market exchange
model, monitored by the government, provides workers with a transparent mechanism
to weigh the benefits and costs of different plans. This model may be appropriate for
health care, but a different approach may be necessary for providing workers with a
portable public-pension system.
Workers in the Gig and On-Demand economy require new public policies and
innovative methods of collective organization. The safety net must buttress a more
mobile labor market prone to high levels of turnover. Traditional employer-employee
relationships have been unraveling for decades and existing protections are rooted in
the 20th century paradigm. Benefits should be tied to workers, not the firms they work
for. Gig and On-Demand workers need portable, universal, and pro-rated benefits, or
else they will be forced to turn to the public coffers when they fall on hard times. In the
Gig and On-Demand economy, tasks are brokered out to workers by a variety of
sources. These workers are not guaranteed a stable or long-term relationship with a
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single job-provider. Gig and On-Demand workers must be organized on a social and
communal basis, and it is possible that a non-governmental approach may be most
effective.
This Thesis will now consider ways to re-think protections and securities for
workers in this sector of the economy. At the heart of the On-Demand economy lies a
vibrant entrepreneurial spirit. Recently, emerging platforms have promised to provide
vital services as well as customer convenience. In the new playing field, convenience
and accessibility must be maintained, but workers also require a functional substitute for
the old protections that no longer ensure stability.

III.

The Façade of Gig and On-Demand Lexicon
In posing reforms for the Gig and On-Demand economy, it is important to

deconstruct the terminology employed by entrepreneurs and pundits. In the past, some
commentators have turned “towards the New Deal as an example of an epoch in which
people mobilized against the market.”362 In other words, free-market advocates tend to
rely on a rhetorical strategy that discredits the protections guaranteed by New Deal-era
policies by arguing that those very protections undermine the will of the market.
Conservatives pundits have long demonized the welfare state and branded safety net
provisions as detriments to overall economic growth. It is important to note that such
rhetorical strategies are part of a partisan agenda rather than objective attempts to
analyze American political economy. The truth is, since the New Deal, the federal
government has played an influential role in shaping and regulating the economy. One
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objective of this Thesis is to demonstrate that the government’s role in shaping the
economy must adapt in order to satisfy the needs of the modern American labor force.
Uber prides itself a harbinger of convenience. Airbnb defines itself as a trusted
community marketplace. TaskRabbit contends that it serves to strengthen communal
ties by bringing people together. All three platforms utilize a rhetorical strategy that
perpetuates a bottom-up narrative. The platforms emphasize the role they play in
empowering local communities as well as liberating American workers. As this Thesis
has discussed thus far, community and worker empowerment is only one side of the
story. Steven Hill credits “techno-visionaries” with coining a do-it-yourself lexicon that
promises workers that they can acquire true independence or even become CEOs of
their own freelancing business.363 He defines the philosophical backbone of the OnDemand economy as a mixture of “progressive utopianism, free-market libertarianism,
environmental aspiration, and anti-government mistrust” that has widespread appeal,
ideologically speaking.364 Like many of Mr. Hill’s critiques, this assessment is heavyhanded. However, there is merit to the point he is making about On-Demand mavericks:
they frame their platforms as, not just tools of convenience, but means of worker
empowerment. Many of the firms surveyed in this Thesis have played a part in
challenging would-be regulations that, in some cases, would ultimately benefit their
workers. It is not a coincidence that taking an anti-regulatory stance happens to benefit
the profit-margins of firms in the On-Demand economy.
Some academics have taken note of this strategy. Writing for the New York
Times, Natasha Singer voices concern that the “terminology” found in the Gig and On363
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Demand economy “frames technology-enabled transactions as if they were altruistic or
community endeavors.” Uber is described as a “ride-sharing” service and Airbnb insists
that “trust is what makes it work.”365 Framing these platforms as such perpetuates a
trend where workers, instead of firms, are forced to bear the brunt of risk. Altruistic
rhetoric “lend[s] an aura of incontestability to app-enabled transactions;” it pushes public
opinion against potential regulations.366
Rhetoric, when its comes to commercial branding, is consequential. The
unregulated nature of the On-Demand economy has major consequences for workers
who are not guaranteed vital social protections. Professor Olivier Blanchard considers
exchanges in the On-Demand economy a form of piracy, plain and simple. Professor
Blanchard believes that Uber “is lionizing the ticket-scalpers of the hired car industry just
because they use a popular app” and users are “praying to the altar of ‘disruption.’”367
To him, it’s not fair that Uber drivers play to a different set of rules than taxi drivers; it
grants them, he implies, a competitive advantage solely derived from a faulty regulatory
infrastructure. Overall, Professor Blanchard is incredibly pessimistic about the OnDemand economy’s capacity to fortify sustainable labor relationships. Instead of
employing common terminology, he prefers to refer to the On-Demand economy as the
“microtransaction economy.” In his view, this sector of the economy should be reserved
for the occasional petty exchange.368 In this regard, I disagree with Professor
Blanchard. His perspective lacks vision. Yes, currently, the On-Demand economy is
woefully under-regulated, which allows firms to prosper at the expense of traditional
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businesses that abide by long-standing regulations. That being said, if adequate
protections were introduced in this sector of the economy, I believe that On-Demand
workers could secure a sustainable standard of living. Today, these platforms are not as
collaborative as their founders claim. And maybe a collaborative experience isn’t what
makes them attractive in the first place. Instead, and in my view, it may be their
convenience and ease of access.

IV.

New Category of Employment
Regulators are confounded by labor relationships in the Gig and On-Demand

economy. In the past, elected officials have turned towards the Fair Labor Standards
Act’s definition of employee - an individual who is compelled “to suffer or permit work” and administered the previously discussed economic realities test when adjudicating a
worker’s employment status. According to the administrator of the Department of
Labor’s Wage and Hour Division, David Weil, the FLSA’s definition of employment
should be applied broadly. In an “Administrator’s Interpretation” published through the
Department of Labor, Mr. Weil refers to the On-Demand economy in writing that:
“Technological advances and enhanced monitoring mechanisms may encourage
companies to engage workers not as employees yet maintain stringent control over
aspects of the workers’ jobs, from their schedules, to the way that they dress, to the
tasks that they carry out. Some employers assert that the control that they exercise over
workers is due to the nature of their business, regulatory requirements, or the desire to
ensure that their customers are satisfied. However, control exercised over a worker,
even for any or all of those reasons, still indicates that the worker is an employee.”369
Without naming any particular firms, or even the On-Demand economy itself, Mr.
Weil is clearly positioning himself and his administration in support of employee
classification for On-Demand workers.
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As has been implied, it is unclear whether classifying these workers as
employees is the best strategy. Partisanship has begun to rear its head in the middle of
the debate, where some Democratic leaders have advocated for “employee rights” and
some Republican leaders are dismayed by the prospect of increased regulation in this
sector of the economy.370 As is the case with political discourse at large, the
demarcation of partisan lines has muddied the waters in terms of attaining logical
outcomes.
Another factor to take into consideration is that not all On-Demand firms operate
under the same business model; employee classification could work for some firms and
not for others. Writing for TechCrunch, Noah Lang offers insight into the reasons why
some On-Demand firms have made the shift to an employee-based workforce. He notes
three “operational characteristics” that dictate whether or not employee classification
makes sense for a given firm. In his view, employee status makes sense for firms that
offer a specialized experience, boast a high customer-to-worker ratio, and/or provide a
convenient, rather than a “truly on-demand,” service. A truly on-demand service is one
where timeliness is a prime motivating factor for consumers, like Uber; it is hard to
schedule a reliable and fixed work schedules at a firm that offers a truly on-demand
service due to the whimsical peaks and valleys in consumer demand.371 Under the
current employment paradigm, not all On-Demand companies can be held to the same
standard. What do business owners do when they are confronted with the prospect of
regulation? They adapt. If Uber drivers were classified as employees, the company
would likely respond by downsizing its fleet and taking a larger cut from each driver’s
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commission. Professor Sundararajan notes that, if Uber drivers were classified as
employees, “it’s very unlikely [that their] take-home pay would rise… they would be able
to drive more hours, but they’d have less flexibility in how they worked.”372 Maybe OnDemand workers would be better served by a third employment classification that
guarantees some benefits and excludes them from others.
Secretary of Labor Tom Perez admits that employee misclassification is an issue
worth confronting, but he is skeptical about the formulation of a new category of
employment.373 When pressed about the concept during an interview, Secretary Perez
deflected the question, saying that “such a solution would require legislative action from
Congress.”374 Senator Mark Warner has expressed some interest in a third category of
employment. He bemoans the fact that, currently, workers are forced to file as
employees (W-2) or independent contractors (1099). He admits that “there may need to
be a third classification.”375
Seth Harris and Alan Krueger have provided the most comprehensive policy
proposal in formulating a new category of employment: The Independent Worker. A
policy brief published by the Hamilton Project cites the “online gig economy” as impetus
for the Independent Worker classification. The brief notes that “the existing legal
framework” surrounding the American labor market “is based on the expectation of a
traditional long-lasting employment relationship in which the employee is reliant on the
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employer for her livelihood.”376 The Independent Worker would occupy the “gray area”
between an employee and independent contractor. Harris and Krueger have cited “three
guiding principles” for providing benefits and protections to Independent Workers:
“1. Immeasurability of work hours. The worker classification system should
recognize that, in these relationships, the line between work and nonwork can be
impossible to measure, and that some work involves hours that cannot be apportioned
to a company and measured for the purpose of assigning benefits.
2. Neutrality. The worker classification system should ensure that businesses do
not have an incentive to organize themselves to fit a certain status to gain an unfair
advantage over other employers.
3. Efficiency. The worker classification system should enable workers and
businesses to maximize the joint benefits that their relationships produce.”377
This Thesis has already alluded to the “triangular relationship” in the On-Demand
economy. There is the worker, the consumer, and the app-based platform that connects
the two. Independent Workers would have the ability to work for multiple platforms at
will but they may also be required to submit to criminal background checks or held to
the whims of firm-dictated wage-setting practices.
In terms of benefits, Independent Workers would be able to organize and
collectively bargain with the platforms for which they work. The National Labor Relations
Act could potentially be amended to guarantee these workers their rights, but Harris and
Krueger imply that collective organizing could be guaranteed through an exemption to
existing antitrust laws. Independent Workers would also be able to pool “employerprovided benefits at a lower cost and higher quality than the workers could obtain on
their own in the private market.” It is unclear exactly what type of benefits they would be
guaranteed. Independent Workers would also be protected by “federal employment
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discrimination laws” and the platforms for which they work would be compelled to
provide “tax-withholding services.” Harris and Krueger argue that, if employers were to
“withhold taxes as an advance payment toward an employee’s final tax liability… [it
would] help employees… smooth their after-tax income throughout the year, and enable
them to avoid the quarterly payments and relevant paperwork filed by other workers.”
Finally, On-Demand firms would also be responsible for paying “half of independent
workers’ contributions toward the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) payroll
taxes for Social Security and Medicare.”378
The goal of the Independent Worker category is flexibility. Therefore, under this
classification, workers would be excluded from receiving some protections. Due to the
“immeasurability of work hours” in the Gig and On-Demand economy, Harris and
Krueger wager that it is unrealistic to guarantee these workers a minimum wage or
“overtime pay for hours worked in a week in excess of forty” hours. Independent
Workers, in their view, should forfeit these protections for the sake of maintaining
autonomy in coordinating their work schedules. Independent Workers would also be
exempt from Unemployment Insurance, because at the current time, that program is
built with dislocated employees in mind. The rationale buttressing the Unemployment
Insurance system doesn’t apply to Independent Workers who choose when and
whether they work. Harris and Krueger do not conclude whether or not employers
should be compelled to take responsibility for on-the job injuries, therefore, whether or
not employers should provide Workers’ Compensation Insurance; Independent Workers
typically do not perform their duties on a particular job site, so it may make sense for
platforms to be exempt from providing this benefit. Finally, Harris and Krueger are of the
378
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opinion that, if a given platform does not provide health insurance, it should be
compelled to pay 5% of an Independent Worker’s earnings (net of commissions)
towards their health care.379
The Independent Worker proposal has drawn praise and condemnation from
many corners of the political community. Writing for the Wall Street Journal, Greg Ip
sees the Independent Worker category as a way to potentially extend “basic rights to
workers in the On-Demand economy… [without] burdening all employers with costs that
ultimately hurt economic growth.”380 It’s important to note that the Independent Worker
proposal was formulated with the future in mind. Harris and Krueger are envisioning
what the workforce could look like years from now. While under a million Americans are
currently working in the On-Demand economy full-time, this number could grow
“exponentially.”381 However, the new category could negatively impact today’s
workforce. Rebecca Smith, deputy director of the National Employment Law Project,
voices concern that “developing a whole new category of workers, especially to respond
to what is a tiny part of the labor market, would engender a race by other businesses to
reclassify their workers in order to avoid accountability.”382 This is a valid concern, but it
also may be the price paid for fundamentally reforming labor laws and the American
safety net. Secretary Perez echoes these concerns. As of yet, he has not commented
on the Independent Worker proposal, but he remains “undeniabl[y] fearful that the ondemand conversation is used as an excuse to further roll back the safety net.” He warns
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that the risk of doing “something that is unduly hasty” could result in more harm than
good.383
Legislators and interest groups across the aisle have expressed concern over the
Independent Worker proposal. Organized labor is weary of any reform that will “water
down worker protections.” One Republican Senator insists “that the last thing we need
to do is come up with some new regulations to stifle… innovation.” David Rolf, a Service
Employees International Union Vice President and leading voice in the American labor
movement, believes that “new categories would give employers an incentive to
reclassify existing workers.” What’s more, he doesn’t “see the labor movement or the
mainstream of the Democratic party supporting” the Independent Worker proposal.384
Labor advocates, like Professor Steven Greenhouse, have voiced vehement opposition
towards the notion that workers in the Gig and On-Demand economy should be exempt
from any, or most, of the protections guaranteed to traditional employees.385 Some have
also argued that introducing a portable vehicle for benefits is a more realistic short-term
goal, but neither of these proposals should be entirely discredited.
In an interview I conducted with Paul Osterman, he expressed skepticism
towards the Independent Worker proposal. “The devil is in the details,” he says, “I don’t
think the numbers yet justify the need for a new category of employment.”386 He
believes workers are best served by strengthening already existing protections and
labor standards across the board. But what if existing protections, at the current time,
are structurally ill-equipped to satisfy the needs of On-Demand workers? Harris and
383
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Krueger may not have offered the most detailed proposal, but at least they are pushing
the barrier in terms of reforming the safety net.
The Independent Worker policy proposal is flawed insofar that it is, at this
juncture, hypothetical. The political coalition necessary to put it into legislation does not
yet exist. Furthermore, if the proposal were to be ratified, it is likely that scores of
employers would re-classify existing employees as Independent Workers for the sake of
cutting operational costs. These workers would find themselves, like so many others, in
a more precarious work arrangement. However, it is also the case that the enactment of
massive reform entails growing pains. Most statistics indicate that the Gig and OnDemand economy is growing at an impressive rate. What could be to the detriment of
today’s workforce could serve to ensure a base-line level of security for tomorrow’s Gig
and On-Demand workforce. The Independent Worker classification could serve to
empower those willing to sacrifice some protections for the sake of increased autonomy.

V.

The Role of Public Policy
Establishing a new category of employment is only one of many possible options

in confronting the risks posed by the Gig and On-Demand economy. Experts and
academics have considered a variety of proposals with the goal of increasing the
portability of benefits and protections. Professor Osterman posits that, for a more mobile
workforce, public policy must “protect people during [job] transitions so that the
consequences of job loss and job changing are less severe than they might be
otherwise” and encourage the construction of “local labor market institutions that make
movement through the labor market easier and more successful than it has been in the
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past.”387 This section will focus on the safety net rather than labor market institutions or
worker organization; the next section of this Thesis will tackle those issues.
For the past few decades, labor advocates have entertained the concept of
workers retaining benefits while they move job-to-job. This concept is somewhat
controversial in a country like America, where the postwar safety net was built with longterm and stable employment in mind. But the construction of a portable benefits system
is possible. Katherine Stone is critical of the fact that workers who “change jobs
frequently risk losing their benefits, yet those who do not change jobs out of fear of
losing benefits… cannot succeed in the current labor market.”388 She posits that Gig
workers could be ensured “individual tax-preferred retirement savings programs,
through expanding the use of individual retirement accounts (IRAs).”389 Because IRAs
are set up on an individual basis, they are tied to workers rather than their employment
relationships. Stone also warns that, as it stands, IRAs are held to the whims of
individuals; unlike Social Security, no government administration is responsible for
safeguarding a worker’s investment or administering their payments incrementally.
With the advent of the On-Demand economy, many experts have voiced support
for an institutional mechanism to tie benefits to individual workers. Senator Warner has
called for a benefits system that is “not tied to employment, such as the healthcare
exchanges set up by the Affordable Care Act.”390 Steve King also notes that the ACA’s
approach towards administering benefits – where health care coverage is guaranteed
regardless of employment status - “can be done with Social Security.” In this scenario,
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the cost of an Uber driver’s benefits package could be covered via “micro-payments.”
Every time an Uber driver completes a ride, a percentage of their commission would be
allocated towards their “Social Security account.” The customer, driver, and the platform
itself could all split the cost.391 The debate surrounding a portable benefits system
presents an especially rare case where both the AFL-CIO and Travis Kalanick (founder
of Uber) are in agreement. The AFL-CIO cites the On-Demand economy as “impetus for
mobile benefits... that can travel with workers, who may increasingly be working for
multiple firms, or moving in and out of full-time work with a single employer.” When
asked for his opinion, Mr. Kalanick voiced agreement: “benefits that move with people,
regardless of where they work, is a very empowering thing.”392 A portable, universal,
and pro-rated benefits system has widespread appeal.
Instead of providing a seemingly endless lists of hypothetical proposals, this
section will discuss one in particular: The Individual Security Account. The concept has
been discussed under a variety of names by many experts, but Steven Hill offers a
comprehensive articulation of the ISA proposal. The system would act as a portable,
universal, and pro-rated benefits system. With ISAs, On-Demand firms like Uber or
TaskRabbit would be compelled to pay, on top of a worker’s commission, “a small levy
of a few dollars per hour… invested in [a worker’s] Individual Security Account.” The
amount paid into an ISA by a given firm would be “pro-rated” based on the number of
hours an individual works or, more realistically, on a percentage of the gross wage they
earn at the completion of an individual task. Under Mr. Hill’s rubric, ISAs would be
prearranged so that both the firm and worker’s payments are allocated “via payroll
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deductions into existing state and federal safety net programs” like Social Security or
Unemployment Insurance.393 Some labor advocates, like David Rolf, have posed
questions about the institution responsible for administering ISA benefits. It is unclear
whether the government should be entirely responsible for monitoring this system.
The Individual Security Account was formulated with the multiemployer
environment in mind. A Gig or On-Demand worker could perform tasks for a variety of
firms and each job-provider would pay into the same ISA account. This is not dissimilar
to the hour-bank system employed by some contractors. Each ISA account would be
assigned an ID number a la Social Security Accounts. Mr. Hill offers an in-depth
example:
“Donna is employed 20 hours a week by a hairdresser, contracts for 10 hours a
week with TaskRabbit, and drives 10 shifts for Uber. She would earn 50% of her [ISA
payments] from the hairdresser, 25% from TaskRabbit, and another percentage based
on her wages driving for Uber. That would amount to earning over three-fourths of her
full-time benefits (based on a 40-hour work week.)” 394
Mr. Hill adds that the ISA system could be overseen by either the government or
a private entity like MBO Partners or the Freelancers Union. Of course, the government
would regulate the system’s operations, but MBO Partners already performs similar
functions for “various safety-net features,” as do some labor unions, or even the
Freelancers Union with the now-defunct Freelancers Insurance Company.395 When Gig
or On-Demand workers fall on hard times, ISAs would grant them a base-line level of
support. This is preferential to them turning to the welfare system. And, aside from startup costs, the ISA program wouldn’t act as a drain on the federal budget.
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Labor leader David Rolf has offered a proposal similar to the ISA called the
Shared Security System. In an interview conducted with Mr. Rolf, he said that while
there may be some slight differences between the two proposals, the “driving force
behind both systems is [instituting a] universal and pro-rated benefits system that any
employer-like entity can pay into.” He admits that what “Steven Hill and l and [my
collaborator] Nick [Hanauer] have come up with is very similar.”396 With Shared Security
Accounts, a worker’s benefits “would be earned and accrued via automatic payroll
deductions, regardless of the employment relationship… [and the] benefits would be
fully pro-rated, portable, and universal.”397 Mr. Rolf and Mr. Hanauer note that the
concept of a pro-rated benefits system is not unfamiliar; Social Security’s credit-system
is pro-rated as well. There is one key concept that differentiates Shared Security
Accounts from Individual Security Accounts: the SSA offers two types of benefits. The
first type of benefit is one that is “accrued over time, retaining a specific dollar value”
and the other is one that provides “insurance against life events, foreseen or otherwise.”
The two “benefits would be accounted for differently.” The former, “mandatory accrued
benefits,” would offer:
“a minimum of five days a year of paid sick leave, 15 days a year of paid vacation
leave, a matching 401(k) contribution, and the same health insurance premium
contribution as currently required under the Affordable Care Act…. Employers - that is
to say, whatever entity is paying the worker - would be required to contribute to the
worker’s Shared Security Account with each paycheck, with the contributions pro-rated
based on a standard eight-hour day, 40-hour week, and 2,080-hour year. For example,
20 days a year of combined vacation and sick leave is equivalent to a contribution of
$0.0769 for every dollar of wages paid, and that is the rate at which companies like
TaskRabbit and Uber would contribute for non-hourly piecework… There would be
restrictions on how and when the worker could withdraw funds.”
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The other type of benefit offered through the SSA, the “mandatory insurance
benefit,” would aggregate “unemployment [insurance], workers’ compensation, and paid
maternity, paternity, family, and medical leave.” These benefits would not be “cash
benefits that the employee could accrue and cash out” at will, “but rather pooled
insurance to which both the employer” and worker would contribute to based on a
percentage of revenues earned by both parties.398
Compared to the ISA, the SSA is more ambitious in terms of proposing a twopronged benefits system that would better protect workers in the Gig and On-Demand
economy. One question remains: who collects and administers these contributions? Mr.
Rolf contends that the ISA or SSA system should be “monitored, not controlled, by the
government. The system [could be] administered by non-profits.” Under this rubric,
workers would be able to choose their providers, much like the ACA’s insurance
exchange system. Mr. Rolf believes that the “government should mandate universal,
pro-rated benefits” and ensure that “50% of [the] board-members” at a non-profit
responsible for administering SSA benefits are “workers themselves.” He hopes that
institutionalizing worker representation, and enforcing proper regulation, would make it
so the non-profits providing benefits are not “beholden to shareholders.” Worker
representation could also serve to keep administration costs low.399 In David Rolf’s
world, the SSA system would be constructed and monitored by the government but
nonprofits would handle the actual provision of benefits. Workers would then be able to
choose their benefits provider. Both ISAs and SSAs are highly ambitious concepts, but
they are also logically practical. Neither system would act as a panacea for precarity in
398
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the Gig and On-Demand economy, but if implemented, workers would be guaranteed a
base-line level of security; benefits would be tied to individuals rather than their
employment relationships. Perhaps either ISAs or SSAs could be reserved for workers
classified as Independent Workers, but this scenario is far too hypothetical to welcome
further analysis.
In preparation for the State of the Union, the Obama administration published a
“Wage Insurance” proposal. Under this plan, “workers laid off from a job they held at
least three years would be eligible for state-based wage insurance if their new job paid
less than the old one” with payment caps set in place. The “insurance payment would
replace half the lost wages… up to $10,000 over two years.”400 The proposal’s goal is to
reform the Unemployment Insurance system. The Obama administration believes that
the Wage Insurance plan would help displaced workers get back on their feet.
According to a “fact sheet” released by the White House, “the President’s plan would
address holes in our UI system – including by expanding coverage to part-time, many
low-income, and intermittent workers, and workers who leave work for compelling family
reasons.”401 The President’s Wage Insurance proposal indicates that American leaders
are beginning to address growing precarity in the American labor market. The same
leaders also recognize that the welfare state must be reformed in order to address the
needs of American workers. It’s worth noting that the President’s proposal would
increase government expenditures, whereas ISAs and SSAs would not rely on federal
and state funding to the same extent. The process of developing Individual or Shared
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Security Accounts may call for an expanded federal bureaucracy, but neither proposal
would act as a drain on the budget. In fact, by providing Gig and On-Demand workers
with a branch to fall on, these proposals could potentially work to decrease federal
spending. Less workers would rely on welfare payments in order to make ends meet.

VI.

The Role of Labor Intermediaries
A labor intermediary is an organization that matches workers and employers

while also providing workers with vital services such as information sharing and labor
advocacy. It’s important to distinguish labor intermediaries from traditional labor unions:
a labor intermediary is an organization that exists outside of a given workplace and
externally mediates employment relationships in some capacity. A labor union, on the
other hand, is a self-defense organization for workers; workers can either form or join
unions in order to advance their interests within a given firm.
According to Professor Osterman, there are three types of labor intermediaries.
Traditional “one-on-one” intermediaries passively match workers with employers who
have registered with said intermediary, like temp agencies. Customized intermediaries
are more “active and aggressive” in trying to satisfy the needs of both employers and
job-seekers; they ensure that both the needs of employers and workers are met. Finally,
a third form of intermediary is that which not only attempts to satisfy the needs of both
employers and workers but also bargains with firms or asserts collective power in order
to alter firm behavior.402 This third form of intermediary plays a similar role to traditional
labor unions, as they are able to influence the decisions made by managers and
business owners, but they are not synonymous with postwar industrial trade unions.
Labor intermediaries are concerned with the needs of both employers and employees.
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Labor unions, on the other hand, exclusively advocate for the needs of a given
workforce. Unions empower workers by endowing them with an institutional capacity to
negotiate with their managers; intermediaries may advocate for workers but they do not
endow a given workforce with autonomous collective power. Due to the fact that labor
intermediaries are external organizations that mediate employment relationships, they
serve a different purpose than unions. That being said, the third form of labor
intermediary that Osterman outlines can potentially act as a functional substitute for
traditional labor unions in the Gig and On-Demand economy.
As boundaries within some American firms have blurred and workers switch jobs
at faster rates, the postwar unionization model has been called into question. The
National Labor Relations Act is predicated upon the premise of workers forming a
bargaining unit within a particular workplace. Instead of precisely defining the term, the
National Labor Relations Board determines what constitutes a bargaining unit “on a
case-by-case basis.” Under the NLRB’s rubric, “bargaining units tend to have static job
definitions and clear departmental boundaries.... The NLRB has a preference for
worksite-specific bargaining units and has adopted a presumption in favor of single
facility units.”403 This approach towards collective organization is unsatisfactory in the
On-Demand economy where workers engage in various types of tasks across a variety
of platforms. For full-time On-Demand workers, the workday is not a static affair.
Katherine Stone argues that “as careers become boundaryless and work becomes
detached from a single employer, unions need to become boundaryless as well.”404
According to her, unions should maintain a communal role and ensure mutual
403
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assistance to their members. Stone’s argument is not dissimilar to the one posed by
(Freelancers Union founder) Sara Horowitz, that unions should encourage “mutual selfhelp amongst members.”405
This theoretical framework underpins Stone’s advocacy for New Craft and Citizen
unionism. As discussed in Chapter 3, New Craft unionism seeks to organize workers
across entire industries and negotiate collective bargaining agreements for a segment
of workers. In this scenario, unions employ an “embedded contract bargaining” model
where they negotiate “a basic agreement that provides for individually negotiated
agreements consistent with [their] terms.”406 Citizen Unionism is a form of collective
organization predicated on geographic proximity. Members of a given “Citizen union”
take part in “all types of workplaces and industries in a given locality. Its goal is to
pressure area-wide employers to provide area-wide workers with the income, benefits,
and training they need to operate in the boundaryless workplace.”407
Much like the American safety net, conventional approaches towards organizing
the American labor force have been rendered inadequate by recent economic
developments. Whatever the feasibility of either New Craft or Citizen unionism, both
concepts seek to address the needs of Gig and On-Demand workers in ways that the
postwar industrial trade union model fails to. Labor leader David Rolf posits that “the
once powerful industrial labor unions that built the mid-century American middle class
are in deep crisis” and unable to advocate for their members “with the scale and power
necessary to reverse contemporary economic trends.”408 Rolf has called for organized
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labor to harken back to its “pre-New Deal roots.” During this period, the labor movement
“was more decentralized and had lots of different and competing strategies.” Through
this approach, Rolf believes labor advocates can usher in the era of “labor 3.0.”409 Other
experts, like Lawrence Summers, agree with Mr. Rolf. Secretary Summers notes that
the NLRA guarantees the right for workers to form unions and bargain collectively with
employers, but “the exercise of these rights can be difficult because of the way the law
is administered” and “the time between worker petitions for representation elections and
the elections themselves can take many months.”410 The NLRA has already posed
problems for On-Demand workers hoping to unionize. In Seattle, where the city council
recently voted in favor of Uber drivers unionizing, lawmakers had to “work around” the
NLRA. While the NLRA guarantees the right for employees to unionize, it does not
explicitly do so for independent contractors. “The National Labor Relations Act does not
preclude independent contractors from organizing,” says labor attorney Dmitri Iglitzin, “it
simply does not give them any rights… [another entity] could give drivers those
rights.”411 The NLRA, the NLRB, and the overall collective bargaining apparatus
established during the New Deal has provided a vital service to millions of American
workers. It’s not that this collective bargaining framework is necessarily detrimental to
today’s workforce, it’s simply a product of another era, and organizing tactics must
evolve.
Some labor leaders in the On-Demand economy have pursued efforts to redefine
collective bargaining. The National Domestic Workers Alliance recently published a
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“Good Work Code” with the goal of “defining what a good work[place] looks like” in this
sector of the economy. 22 firms have endorsed the Good Work Code so far. Its eight
core values are “safety, stability and flexibility, transparency, shared prosperity, a living
wage, inclusion and input, support and connection, and growth and development.”412 In
an interview, one of the NDWA’s leaders gave an example of how one On-Demand firm,
SketchDeck, is abiding by the Code: the firm provides “design services mostly to
businesses” and is “developing a creative way to aggregate designers and clients in a
way that compensates designers, regardless of whether or not their work generates a
contract.”413 In this case, SketchDeck is actively advocating for its On-Demand labor
force.
What’s more, the NDWA and the Good Work Code offer a form of organizing that
isn’t contingent upon government action. In the words of one of the NDWA’s leaders,
the On-Demand economy is a “growing economy that’s still establishing its norms and
values, so there’s room to build [satisfactory labor standards] into its DNA.” At this
juncture, the NDWA finds it necessary to work with companies “outside of the political
process,” not because policy is unimportant, but because their approach builds “an
alternative center of gravity in Silicon Valley where real dialogue and real progress on
these questions can take place.”414 While public policy should act to bridge the gap
between security and depravity in the Gig and On-Demand economy, it’s important to
create a professional landscape that welcomes a variety of approaches towards labor
organization. As this Thesis has argued at many points, the On-Demand economy
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subverts traditional labor relationships; the best way to navigate untrodden territory is by
welcoming innovation rather than setting industry-wide standards that may not benefit
workers in the most efficient manner possible.
David Rolf echoes these sentiments. “The enterprise-based collective bargaining
model is dead,” he says, “now is the time to take risks… we ought to embrace
change.”415 It is for this reason that Rolf founded The Workers Lab, which studies and
invests in organizations that “have the potential to build economic power for workers, at
scale, and to sustain themselves financially.” Rolf contends that these organizations will
not be unions “as they currently exist.”416 His perspective validates the argument in
favor of the third type of labor intermediary outlined by Professor Osterman. Rather than
applying 20th century collective bargaining standards to the emerging On-Demand
economy, workers could benefit from being represented by a labor intermediary that
externally advocate for their needs. In this way, intermediaries could act as a functional
substitute for labor unions.
Mr. Rolf’s goal, which has drawn condemnation from some members of the labor
community, is to “amass power for workers” through means other than “the decaying
collective bargaining regime of the past eight decades.” He doesn’t have a “singular
theory of what will build worker power,” but that’s the point: workers are navigating
untrodden territory.417 Different models for organizing workers in the On-Demand
economy need to be applied to a real-world context in order to discover which is most
effective. Even though the Workers Lab launched just over a year ago, Rolf notes that
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there have already been some instances of success. He points to the “Better Builder
Program,” a collaboration between the Workers Defense Project and real estate
developers that seeks “to create both high-quality jobs and high-quality buildings
throughout Texas” by setting industry-wide standards in the Texan construction
industry. The BBP’s approach applies a worker-led labor standards enforcement
strategy and employs “certification and labeling,” which guarantees that the materials
being used at a given work-site are ethically sourced. With some assistance from local
developers and local governments, the Better Builder Program is leveraging the
“marketplace to make it annoying and costly for developers to not use the worker-led
program… if developers follow the rules, they earn the [certification] label.”418 The
BBP’s industry-wide and locality-based approach is reminiscent of Stone’s New Craft
and Citizen unionism.
When asked how member-led enforcement programs could manifest in the OnDemand economy, Mr. Rolf pointed to a given labor force’s disruptive capacity as the
key factor. He gives an example: “Imagine that a group of Uber drivers in Cleveland got
together and formed ‘Ride-Share Drivers United.’” The drivers could then produce a list
of demands, but “they have to do something disruptive to bring the company to the
table. [They could present] legislation, [go on] strike… [or threaten to] go work for Lyft…
[the] real money prize is” pinpointing “what is truly disruptive.” In this way, Mr. Rolf
believes that the “question isn’t how… a worker-led enforcement program [would] work,
it’s the question of how do [they] disrupt effectively. Change comes from having power.
Power generally comes from disruption or the credible threat of destruction.”419
418
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Asserting collective power in the On-Demand economy is a nonstarter if workers
are unable to effectively demonstrate their ability to disrupt the platforms for which they
work. As evidenced in Chapter 2, On-Demand platforms can be used to mobilize
grassroots support. App-based technology allows for a depth of interaction that can be
used to garner sympathy from a platform’s user-base. If workers align themselves with a
technologically proficient ally, it is possible that they could develop their own methods of
mobilizing grassroots support, similar to the WGA during the 2007-08 strike. However,
On-Demand workers should first pursue a collaborative, rather than antagonistic,
approach. As the Good Work Code indicates, some firms are willing to collaborate with
workers in order to develop collective organization. But if a collaborative approach
proves fruitless in the future, maybe it would be preferable for On-Demand workers to
demonstrate their disruptive potential.
It may also be necessary for the government to intervene in developing new
methods of collective organization. Professor Osterman notes that “the Department of
Labor has the resources [necessary] to fund” a Workers Lab-esque approach towards
generating competing models of labor organization.420 He points to the National Fund
for Workforce Solutions, which describes itself as a “growing national partnership of
employers, workers, communities and philanthropy that strengthens local economies by
implementing demand-driven strategies that create talent supply chains, advance
workers into family-supporting careers, and improve workforce development systems.”
More specifically, the National Fund for Workforce solutions “promotes the development
of employer-led industry partnerships that guide educational and training investments in
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[worker] skills and credentials.”421 In some ways, the National Fund also embodies the
third-form of labor intermediary outlined by Professor Osterman. It externally fosters ties
between employers and their workers with the goal of setting industry-wide standards
and community-designed strategies.422 This approach, a la New Craft and Citizen
unionism, emphasizes setting standards that are appropriate given the communal
context in which they manifest. Unfortunately, the National Fund for Workforce Solutions
is funded by corporate donors like JPMorgan Chase and Co., Boeing, and the
Rockefeller Foundation.423 Perhaps the National Fund could more effectively advocate
for workers if it were to derive funding through the equivalent of union dues instead of
corporate charity.

VII.

In Conclusion
I have argued that the On-Demand economy has tremendous potential, and if we

can muster the necessary political will, our institutions and elected officials can reorient
the American safety net so that it is compatible with the flexibility and forms of
commercial exchange fostered by technological innovations in this sector of the
economy. On-Demand employment relationships should not be synonymous with
precarious work arrangements. Workers can be ensured base-line protections while
also having the capacity to freely navigate the On-Demand labor market.
As is the case with any emerging economic sector, the On-Demand economy, at
the current time, is turbulent. Existing systems and institutions adhere to a rubric crafted
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during America’s industrial heyday. We live in a new era. Despite my cautious optimism,
the On-Demand economy poses some cause for concern. Across the industry, OnDemand employment relationships are concurrent with those of the larger Gig economy,
many start-ups are prone to failure, and some venture capitalists have grown skeptical.
However, as was the case with the mid-20th century American economy, major
institutions have the prerogative to re-define the On-Demand economy and unleash its
potential.
In posing reforms, policymakers and labor advocates must thwart the allure of
partisan appeals. Some business leaders in the On-Demand economy employ rhetoric
that implicitly discredits the prospect of increased regulation. We mustn’t resign
ourselves to ideological rivalry. Over the course of this Thesis, I have come to the
conclusion that conventional public policies and means of organizing workers are
defunct in the On-Demand economy, but at the same time, the insecurity On-Demand
workers face is untenable. A middle ground exists and some experts are within its
striking distance.
Many scholars and officeholders are conflicted as to whether or not On-Demand
workers should be classified as employees or independent contractors. With the
Independent Worker proposal, Seth Harris and Alan Krueger hope to establish a new
category of employment that will ensure a base-line level of security for Gig and OnDemand workers while also allowing them to maintain the flexibility necessary to
navigate the labor market with ease. Institutionalizing a new category of employment is
an ambitious project, and doing so would have unforeseen consequences, but the

151

Independent Worker proposal serves the purpose of arousing necessary debate and
may even open the door for much-needed reform.
With Individual or Shared Security Accounts, Steven Hill, David Rolf, and Nick
Hanauer offer logical proposals for instituting a portable, universal, and pro-rated
vehicle that provides benefits to workers in the Gig and On-Demand economy. It is not
entirely clear how such a vehicle would be put in place, but it may make sense for the
government to provide oversight while non-profits compete with one another in
administering benefits to workers. This system would act similarly to the health
insurance exchange introduced by the Affordable Care Act.
Finally, Paul Osterman, Katherine Stone, Sara Horowitz and David Rolf all
suggest that the enterprise-based collective bargaining model is not the most effective
model for organizing workers in the On-Demand economy. Instead, labor intermediaries
should pilot new forms of collective organization on a firm-by-firm basis, strengthen
communal bonds in a given locality, and advocate for On-Demand workers across the
industry. In order for On-Demand workers to procure collective power it is crucial that
they acquire disruptive capacity, and the technology underpinning On-Demand
platforms may prove a vital ally in this regard.
None of the proposals outlined in this Thesis can single-handedly act as a
panacea for the struggles workers face in the On-Demand economy. In order for OnDemand workers to secure prosperity, the labor market must be reoriented so workers
can willfully incur increased risk, and in return, be granted a greater level of autonomy.
On-Demand firms will continue to generate consumer demand as long as they provide
unique or even vital services through innovative mechanisms. The profitability of a given
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firm is not contingent upon the subjugation of its labor force. The virtuous cycle ushered
in by the New Deal can be reimagined in the On-Demand economy.

153

Glossary:
Airbnb

A home-sharing On-Demand platform and one of the more
popular On-Demand services. The platform connects
homeowners or renters with guests who can rent space for a
given period of time.

Alternative Work Arrangements

Employment arrangements that break from the norms of
traditional employment relationships. Under these arrangements,
workers can either be self-employed, work part-time, work
irregular hours, or adhere to a different set of employment
standards. Alternative work arrangements can - but are not
required to - welcome as much risk as precarious work
arrangements.

•

See also: Nontraditional or
Flexible Work Arrangements.

The American Safety Net
•

See also: Social Insurance
System

Contingent Workers
•

See also: Gig Workers,
Independent Workers,
Freelancers, Nonpermanent
Workers, Independent
Contractors, 1099 Workers, the
Independent Workforce

An amalgamation of systems, institutions, and public policies,
primarily established by the federal government, that serve to
protect American workers from falling into poverty. The American
safety was largely composed during the postwar era.
Workers engaged in an employment arrangement that does not
guarantee them the same set of services, benefits, and
protections that traditional employees receive. These workers file
1099-MISC tax forms as opposed to W-2s. As a result, they
populate the Gig economy, where workers move firm-to-firm
rather than situate themselves in a long-term employment
relationship with a single employer.
(Author’s note: there are some slight variations amongst these
definitions; see Chapter 1 Section II for details).

Employees

Largely refers to workers engaged in traditional employment
arrangements but can also refer to individuals engaged in
precarious or alternative ones.

Employer-Employee Relationship

Any sort of employment arrangement in which an individual
performs a task or service, long-term or not, for a single jobprovider (firm, manager, or On-Demand platform). A major focal
point of this Thesis is investigating how American employment
relationships have evolved since the New Deal and been
transformed in the Gig and On-Demand economy.

•

See also: Employment
Relationship

Gig Economy

A sector of the economy in which workers engage in precarious
or nontraditional employment arrangements; neither employers
nor their workers have the expectation of long-term commitment.
Over the past half-century, the Gig economy has grown at an
alarming rate as more and more workers have been excluded
from traditional employment relationships and the vital protections
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they entail.

Independent or Shared Security
Accounts

Two proposals brought forth by Steven Hill (in the case of ISAs)
and David Rolf and Nick Hanauer (in the case of SSAs) with the
goal of introducing a universal, portable, and pro-rated vehicle for
ensuring protections and benefits in the Gig and On-Demand
economy.

The Independent Worker

A third category of employment proposed by Seth Harris and Alan
Krueger. Their proposal was inspired by the advent of the OnDemand economy and has the goal of ensuring workers some
vital protections while excluding them from others as to allow for
flexibility in the labor market.

Labor Intermediary

A labor intermediary, in its most crude form, is an organization
that matches workers with employers. These organizations serve
to externally mediate employer-employee relationships. There are
various types of labor intermediaries and this Thesis is primarily
concerned with those that assert external pressure on a given
firm in order to advocate for a segment of the workforce. Labor
intermediaries are not synonymous with labor unions.

On-Demand Economy

A subset of the Gig economy in which contingent work is
facilitated by app-based platforms. The On-Demand economy is
distinct from the Gig economy in that it arouses a “triangular”
relationship comprised of a consumer, a worker, and the OnDemand platform that connects the two. As Rachel Botsman
articulates, exchanges in the On-Demand economy are largely
time-sensitive.
Due to its utilization of technological innovations, the On-Demand
economy, as this Thesis argues, has the potential to occupy a
significant and valuable role in the American economy in a way
the Gig economy does not.

On-Demand Platform(s)

The business model on which the On-Demand economy is
predicated. These app-based platforms allow workers to engage
with and/or provide services to consumers. Some argue that OnDemand platforms grant workers increased autonomy; others
argue they exert undue influence over workers. On-Demand
platforms also bring about triangular consumption relationships.

(Labor Market) Precarity

A culture in which employees are laid off more frequently,
guaranteed less benefits and services, and forced to shoulder the
burden of increased corporate instability. The growing number of
precarious work arrangements has contributed to an atmosphere
of fear and uncertainty within the American labor market.

Precarious Work Arrangements

Employment relationships that breed insecurity and uncertainty.
Workers, rather than firms or employers, are forced to bear the
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brunt of risks associated with employment. In these
arrangements, workers are not guaranteed job security, stable
wage-rates, or the protections outlined by the American safety
net.

Postwar Era
•

See also: Traditional
employment relationships,
Traditional Work Arrangements,
or Fordism

The time period (spanning from the mid-to-late 20th century) in
which employment relationships abided by the norms and
practices established by New Deal-era institutions and public
policies. The postwar industrial model for employer-employee
relationships guaranteed workers a generous set of services and
protections. During this period, both firms and workers operated
under the assumption of mutual long-term commitment. Firms
offered workers internal promotion schemes, stable wage-rates,
and the implicit promise of job security.

TaskRabbit

An On-Demand labor-brokering platform. The firm matches
workers (or Taskers) with consumers seeking a service or
exchange on a task-by-task basis. Taskers can provide a variety
of services in multiple industries.

Uber

An On-Demand ride-sharing platform and possibly the most
popular On-Demand service. The firm matches drivers, operating
their personal vehicles, with consumers.
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